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Abusive Prosecutors: Gender, Race & Class
Discretion and the Prosecution of
Drug-Addicted Mothers*
DWIGHT L. GREENE**
It came as a shock.., and then I was pretty angry. Addiction is a medical
problem. You wouldn't put a heart patient in jail for having a heart attack
And you wouldn't prosecute an epileptic for having a seizure ... It's been a
nightmarel ... My baby was taken away from his mother for the first ten
months of his life; there was no bonding with his mother. If this was to pro-
tect my baby, [taking him away] was more damaging... And what about
my other children?... And one more thing, after all the publicity in my case,
the prosecutor later prosecuted a thirty-six year old white woman lawyer to
show he wasn't prejudiced; but the judge dismissed her case quick
Ms. K. Hardy, first Michigan prosecution for delivering drugs to unborn.
1
S OME pregnancies are being transmogrified into a front in the "war on
drugs." Mothers are being prosecuted; their newborns taken away.
In these selective anti-drug crusades, prosecutors claim they are carrying
out their appropriate role in executing the will of the American people in
the "war on drugs." These prosecutors typically say they just want to
teach some drug-addicted pregnant women a lesson: if you use crack/
cocaine while pregnant, society will prosecute you for distributing drugs
to your unborn.
Others, however, do not see these prosecutions as reflecting the leg-
* Copyright © 1991, Dwight L. Greene and the Buffalo Law Review. All rights reserved.
* Associate Professor of aw, Hofstra University; B.A. Wesleyan, 1970; J.D. Harvard, 1974.
The author writes with the double consciousness of an outsider who is inside, experiencing two
different Americas; see, eg., Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech On
Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 434-35; who knows the terrain up from civil rights, see R. BRooKs,
RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM 20 n.24 (1990); and who was a federal prosecutor in
New York City. Thanks are due to many; but especially to Professors Twila L. Perry, Paulette M.
Caldwell, Dorothy E. Roberts, Lanie Guinier, Martha L. Fineman, Robert H. Hammel, Wendy M.
Rogovin, and for his support, Dean Stuart Rabinowitz; and to my research assistants Jaime Rodri-
guez, Ruby Matin and Fernando Morales.
1. Interviews for the purposes of this article by author and assistants with Ms. Kimberly Hardy
on Friday, February 8, 1991 and December 3, 1990. (Memorandum of interviews on file with au-
thor). In April, 1991, an appellate court reversed nisi prius and dismissed the felony complaint
against Ms. Hardy based on its interpretation of the drug statute used by the prosecutor. The Michi-
gan Supreme Court in July, 1991, denied the prosecutor's application for leave to appeal. People v.
Hardy, 188 Mich. App. 305, 469 N.W.2d 50 (1991), appeal denied, 91346 (Mich. 1991).
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islated will of the American people, or as just and unbiased exercises of
prosecutorial discretion. Many state courts, advocates for women and
minorities, and legal academics critique these prosecutions as beyond the
legislative intent of general anti-drug distribution laws and as perni-
ciously biased, unconstitutional prosecutions against women, particularly
poor women of color.2 While sound, these critiques do not go far
enough.
A central yet unexamined aspect of these prosecutions is whether
they reflect inherent defects in democratic controls over prosecutorial
discretion. Currently, there is no independent public source of informa-
tion about systemic characteristics and practices of prosecutorial justice.
Partially because of this lack of information, there is little control over
American prosecutors. This is particularly so at the precharging stage
where, from behind closed doors, prosecutors choose which laws to en-
force, how to enforce them, and whom they should be enforced against.
Thus, where prosecutions are even arguably authorized by statute, prose-
cutors enjoy vast unfettered power because judicial constraints are ane-
mic and the efficacy of other controls is ineffective.
These concerns are exacerbated in the context of the prosecution of
drug-addicted mothers. Here, the effects of prosecutorial policy choices
on minorities, women and children are obfuscated by calling these
choices part of a "war on drugs." In the frenzy of rousing drug war
hyperbole there is great risk of unrealized and unchecked exercises of
prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutors reflect the unstated but operative
norms in American courtrooms which are predominately affluent, white,
usually male, and often Protestant perspectives.3 Instead of unbiased
law enforcement which respects the autonomy of women, these prosecu-
tions may be based on pluralistic ignorance,4 discrimination predicated
2. See, ag., Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babier Women of Color, Equality, and
the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1419, 1425 (1991).
3. There has been little scholarly focus on the race, gender and class of the prosecutor's voice in
America. Generally, in American legal institutions the norm, if unspecified, is presumptively white,
male and upper middle class. See- g., Scales-Trent, Women in the Lawyering Proce.' The Compli-
cations of Categories 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 337, 339 (1990) (noting that the white male is pre-
sumed to represent the paradigm of what is considered "normal"); cf. White, Subordination,
Rhetorical Survival SkillA and Sunday Shoew Notes on the Hearing of Mr G., 38 BUFFALO L. REv.
1, 20-21 (1990) (recalling the historical exclusivity and continuing predominance of the white male
voice through the denial of legal capacity, including testimonial, to both men and women of color
and white women). A similar white male norm exists throughout even a relatively progressive state
court system. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON MINORITIES, Vol. I at
12 (April 1991).
4. Pluralistic ignorance refers to erroneous cognitive beliefs or knowledge shared by one group
regarding other individuals or groups. O'GORmAN, Pluralistic Ignorance and Reference Groups: The
[Vol. 39
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upon class, racial, ethnic and cultural group characteristics,' and the lack
of women's power and reproductive rights. Alternative perspectives on
the prosecution of drug-addicted mothers, currently eclipsed by drug war
rhetoric, ought to be investigated and appropriately incorporated.
Independent systemic information about what prosecutors actually
do is a critical first step in controlling prosecutors. Information is the
basis for legislative reform, judicial intervention, and most important, the
formation of citizen coalitions which would hold prosecutors accounta-
ble and transform prosecutors' offices into unbiased, nonoppressive, gov-
ernmental offices. To rectify our lack of information about prosecutorial
discretion and its particularized impact upon eclipsed constituents, this
article proposes the creation of Prosecutorial Research, Information and
Reporting Boards.
These Boards would have dual functions. Their primary function
would be to study and generate public information on American prosecu-
tors. This would facilitate monitoring prosecutors and be a step towards
improving democratic controls over prosecutorial discretion. The
Boards' second function would be to balance prosecutors' biased
majoritarian perspectives with outsider community perspectives on
prosecutorial justice.
Prosecutors publicly characterize their own behavior as consistent
with the law and in pursuit of some public policy they perceive to be
generally accepted, such as the "war on drugs." The Boards proposed
below are designed to provide counterpoint to this public orchestration
of prosecutorial policies by independently studying and reporting pat-
terns of prosecutorial behavior. And given the proposed method for
composing Board membership, the Boards should not only tell independ-
ent stories, but also reveal the perspectives of the outsider communities
most affected by prosecutors. Voices now drowned out, like those of mi-
nority women, should have a better chance of being heard.
To create this potential for outsiders to be heard, the membership of
each Board would be elected in proportion to the communities where the
prosecuted crimes occurred.6 To the extent that prosecutors and their
Case ofIngroup Ignorance, in SURVEYING SoCIAL LIFE, PAPER IN HONOR OF HERBERT H. HYMAN
148 (H. O'Gorman ed. 1988). For a more in-depth discussion of pluralistic ignorance, see infra
notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
5. See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. L. FORUM 139,
152-60 (1989); Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581
(1990).
6. This scheme builds upon current law which requires that part of the crime occur within the
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intake agencies, like the police, focus disproportionately on minority and
other less powerful communities, these Boards would create feedback
mechanisms, balancing prosecutors' majoritarian perspectives with those
of the communities most impacted. Compton or Harlem would have
more representation on the local Board than Beverly Hills or the Upper
East Side of Manhattan. Thus, while not altering majoritarian control
over the selection of prosecutors, the proposed Boards would reflect the
interests of, and be more sensitive to, those most directly affected by
crime and its prosecution, such as victims, defendants, relatives, friends
or neighbors of Board members and their discrete communities.7
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses prosecutorial
discretion and its potential abuse. The prosecution of drug-addicted wo-
men is used as a paradigm. Part II surveys the justifications for allowing
prosecutors wide latitude and the current inadequate constraints on their
discretion. The ways in which the demographics, pluralistic ignorance
and ideology of American courts contribute to doctrinal anemia is high-
lighted. Part III discusses how gender, color and class may perniciously
influence prosecutors and how feminist and critical race methodologies
can help reveal these biases. Finally, Part IV discusses some reforms and
proposes the creation of the Boards. It outlines the dual functions of the
Boards in providing information for democratic control of prosecutors
and providing outsider community perspectives to expose gender, race
and class biases.
prosecutor's local jurisdiction to establish venue. It assumes, however, that most jurisdictions are
conglomerates of even smaller communities and that minority views may be systemically eclipsed
within the larger unit.
7. These Boards would not necessarily cure the disease of prosecutorial injustice based on gen-
der, race or class. Reform actually might serve majoritarian interests by legitimizing prosecutors'
offices that remain controlled by dominant white male norms. Cf D. BELL, AND WVE ARE NOT
SAVED 63 (1987)(suggesting that reforms resulting from civil rights litigation invariably promote the
interests of the white majority in America). Moreover, the substantive positions of even the "out-
sider" members of these Boards are not determined and entirely predictable. This problem in repre-
sentational democracy is analogous to the problems and assumptions of "minority" districts under
the Voting Rights Act. As Professor Lani Guinier has observed in her powerful article on that Act,
assuring authenticity and responsiveness of elected minority representatives is no easy task. Guinier,
The Triumph of Tckenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1103, 1133 (1991) (suggesting that authenticity refers to community-based and
culturally rooted leadership which psychologically values the group from which the representative
comes, and that responsiveness assumes a community system of accountability that extends beyond
election day ballots to include ongoing monitoring and political participation).
[Vol. 39
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I. PROSECUTORLAL DISCRETION
A. A Selective Gateway to Criminal Court
Prosecutorial discretion is a potential source of societal injustice.
The prosecution of poor, minority, drug-addicted women is a paradigm
of our lack of control over prosecutorial discretion. While the issue of
whether women should be prosecuted for drug related behavior during
pregnancy has been considered elsewhere on the merits,' the focus of this
article will be on the democratic institutional defects which allow the
problems revealed by the prosecutions of drug-addicted mothers to arise.
Focusing upon these prosecutions is like peering through a magnifying
glass into the hegemony of prosecutorial discretion.
Kimberly Hardy's story is fairly typical. Ms. Hardy, an African-
American, not married,9 unemployed mother of three, was not known to
the police or prosecutors prior to being charged in connection with her
pregnancy in August of 1989. Indeed, before the birth of her son, Ar6-
anis, Ms. Hardy had scant contact with even health officials.' 0 Prenatal
care had been limited since she had no private health coverage, little pub-
lic health coverage, and little money."
Ms. Hardy became addicted to crack after having been socially in-
troduced to cocaine. She attempted to obtain treatment for her addiction
and had made some progress towards restoring her health when she suf-
fered a relapse shortly before her baby was born.'2 And unfortunately, as
is typical throughout much of the United States,13 no treatment was
available for drug-addicted pregnant women in Muskegon County,
Michigan, where Ms. Hardy lives.' 4 Ms. Hardy, a bright, articulate wo-
8. Eg., Dolgin, The Law's Response to Parental Alcohol and Crack Abuse 56 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 1213 (1991); Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23 DUQ. L.
REV. 1, 76 (1984); Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs" The Case Against the Ciminalization of
"Fetal Abuse", 101 HARv. L. REv. 994, 1009-1012 (1988); Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The
Need to Provide Legal Protection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1209 (1987); Roberts, supra note
2, at 1425; Kolata, Racial Bias Seen on Pregnant Addicts, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1990, at A13, col. I
(reporting Charleston, S.C. mandatory treatment option in lieu of criminal prosecutions).
9. Ms. Hardy is still residing with her baby's father.
10. Memorandum, supra note 1.
11. Hoffman, Pregnant, Addicted- and Guilty?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1990, (Magazine), at 44,
53.
12. Id.
13. See, eg., Lee, Pregnant Drug Abusers Find Hope in Program, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1990, at
B3, col. 1 (reporting 500,000 drug abusers in New York City but treatment for only 42,000, with
programs frequently rejecting pregnant women); Hoffman, supra note 11, at 33 (stating few pro-
grams nationwide accept pregnant drug-addicted women because of liability problems posed by high
risk pregnancies).
14. Memorandum, supra note 1. Ms. Hardy was born in Mississippi where she graduated from
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
man with a high school education, was not aware that cocaine drug ad-
diction might have long-term deleterious effects on her unborn, but
nevertheless wanted to be rid of her drug dependency for her family and
herself.15
At the time Ms. Hardy delivered Ar6anis in the local county hospi-
tal the baby seemed healthy to her. Yet when she left the hospital, her
premature baby did not go with her. Eleven days later Ms. Hardy was
informed that not only would her new son not be coming home, but also
that her two older children were being removed. Thereafter, Ms. Hardy
was charged with child abuse and the delivery of cocaine via the umbili-
cal cord to her new-born infant. 6 Ms. Hardy was selected for prosecu-
tion after the prosecutor, Tony Tague, requested area hospitals to report
any babies testing positive for cocaine at birth.17 Prosecutor Tague, a
white male with some training in the Manhattan District Attorney's Of-
fice, did this to "educate these women to realize that there are conse-
quences not only to the child... but also the legal consequences that I
would consider reckless behavior. [My] No. I concern is protection of
the children.""8 While this may be true, Ms. Hardy's prosecution also
garnered Tague, a small time local prosecutor, national recognition as a
warrior in the "war on drugs."19 Another result of the prosecutor's war
was that Ar6anis spent his first ten months without Ms. Hardy, his
high school before moving to Michigan.. This is a typical post World War II migration of Southern
African-Americans in search of opportunity. See generally N. LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND:
THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND HOW IT CHANGED AMERICApasim (1991). Lemann's book
is flawed in suggesting that the underclass culture in Northern ghettos is directly traceable to this
migration pattern. Systematic research indicates that Southern-born African-Americans generally
experienced greater economic success than their Northern-born counterparts and that their northern
migration has not produced the contemporary plight of urban African-Americans. See P. Ritchey,
Urban Poverty and Rural to Urban Migration, 39 RURAL SOCIOLOGY 12, 26 (1974) (cited in W.J.
WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 178 n.68 (1987) (noting that urban poverty is largely the
consequence of age, being a female head of household, or the status imputed on being black and not
rural to urban migration)).
15. Memorandum, supra note 1.
16. Hoffman, supra note 11, at 44, 53. Ms. Hardy was charged under a drug trafficking statute.
17. Id. at 44.
18. MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour (WNET television broadcast, June 28, 1990) (transcript on file
with author).
19. Hoffman, supra note 11, at 55. Tague's self promotion has even gone so far as to publish a
"book" with his picture in the front, chronicling his office's "multi-disciplinary" approach in the
search by prosecutors "across the nation" for ways to combat the threat of infants born with cocaine
or other harmful drugs in their system. A. TAGUE, DRUGS: PROTECTION OF PREGNANT ADDICTS
AND DRUG AFFECTED INFANTS IN MUSKEGON COUNTY, MICHIGAN: A MULTI-DIsCIPLINARY
APPROACH OF PROSECUTION AND TREATMENT (1991). Among its many defects, omissions and
misrepresentations, the "book" does not indicate that both of the prosecutions actually initiated by
Tague have been dismissed by Michigan courts as inconsistent with the legislative statutory intent.
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mother. After ten months the state finally allowed Ar6anis to come
home, along with his two older siblings.20
Prosecutions like that of Ms. Hardy raise a congeries of difficult
legal, moral and ethical questions, especially by those sensitive to govern-
mental behavior which may be biased against women and minorities. In
the interview quoted above, Ms. Hardy herself identified four ways in
which these prosecutions may be abusive. First, these addicted women
have such diminished capacity for choice that it is inappropriate to crimi-
nally prosecute them for the involuntary delivery of drugs to part of their
body, their unborn. Second, in addition to being arbitrary and abusive,
the effect of these prosecutions on the women and their families, includ-
ing the infants, is so damaging that it outweighs any societal benefit.2
Third, prosecutors' targets may be perniciously chosen based upon the
confluence of their race, gender and class.22 And finally, Ms. Hardy al-
ludes to the tendency of prosecutors to expand abusive behavior initially
targeted at powerless groups to the relatively more privileged. Abusive
practices and accretions of state power legitimized in the context of the
war on minority drug users establishes precedents easily extended to the
general population.
To appreciate the perception that prosecutors are inappropriately
targeting poor, minority, drug-addicted women for prosecution, it is nec-
essary to focus on prosecutors' proactive role in creating this entire cate-
gory of prosecution. The problem of babies born to drug-addicted
women is not new, 23 yet criminal prosecutions of the mothers involved is
20. Memorandum, supra note 1. See generally Rimer, Drugs. Then Bureaucracy, Divide Mother
and Children, N.Y.Times, Jan. 15, 1991, at B1, col. 2 (reporting how society is better at protective
separation of drug-addicted mothers from their children than in putting these families back together,
even after successful recovery from addiction).
21. These prosecutions are bad policy choices because they give too little weight to the excuse of
drug addiction, the effects of addiction, history and current life circumstances on childbearing
choices, and the ability of poor and minority addicted women to both provide for themselves and
their children. The preferred policy would be to create safe harbors for these distressed women and
their families. See Lee, supra note 13 (comprehensive, community-based programs offering prenatal
care and drug counseling for pregnant mothers have proven successful in practice). See generally M.
EDELMAN, FAMILIES IN PERIL: AN AGENDA FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 83-94 (1987) (suggesting that
society needs to develop better family support systems); Dolgin, supra note 8, at 1215 (suggesting
that the disadvantages of coercive intervention in the families of drug-addicted parents often exceed
the societal benefits).
22. Eg., Dolgin, supra note 8, at 1228; Roberts, supra note 2, at 1424. See also Kolata, supra
note 8, at 13 (reporting that the majority of women who are prosecuted for using drugs while preg-
nant are members of racial minorities, despite the fact that the problem is just as severe amongst
white, middle class women).
23. Eg., Carcaterra, Mother Hale of Harlem Has Saved 487 Drug-Addicted Babies With an Old
Miracle Cure Love, PEOPLE, March 5, 1984, at 211.
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relatively new.24 And'what has changed is not the law but prosecutors'
interpretation and enforcement of already extant general statutes.
Prosecutions of drug-addicted mothers generally have not been
brought under statutes specifically addressed to the problem of drug-ad-
dicted mothers and the harm they may cause to their unborn or newly
born children. Rather, these prosecutions have been predicated upon
novel theories and adaptations of child abuse or neglect statutes, assault/
battery statutes, or even drug trafficking statutes.2"
And although the courts of last resort in most jurisdictions have not
yet been heard from, the developing weight of state court authority re-
jects these criminal prosecutions of drug-addicted mothers as beyond the
legislative intent of general drug prohibition and other statutes.2 6 Prose-
cutors appear to be usurping state legislative authority by stretching and
distorting drug laws. Whether their recent interpretations of more gen-
eral statutes are sound, prosecutors and not legislators are the agency
now deciding that drug-addicted mothers should be criminally prose-
24. Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood Feminist Theory and State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103
HARv. L. REv. 1325, 1329-30 (1990) [hereinafter Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood ]. The issue is not
whether women can or should be prosecuted for other crimes, such as the sale or possession of
contraband drugs. Rather, the issue is whether drug-addicted women should be prosecuted for the
separate possible crime of exposure of their unborn children to contraband drugs through the umbili-
cal cord.
25. Kg., Hoffman, supra note 11, at 33 (detailing Ms. Hardy's story as typical); Phillips, Lawyer
Says Harshbarger Altered Fetus Case Facts, Boston Globe, Aug. 14, 1990, at 17, col. 1 (reporting
D.A.'s dropping fetal homicide charges); Whitaker, Protecting Baby From Mom, N.Y. Newsday,
Nov. 6, 1989, at 8 (reporting Florida conviction of 23 year old woman for "delivering cocaine
through umbilical cord" to her child); McNamara, Fetal Endangerment Cases on the Rise, Boston
Globe, Oct. 3, 1989, at 1, col. 2 (stating that prosecution for fetal endangerment is on the rise as a
result of the Supreme Court's decision to give states greater power in regulating abortions in Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services Inc. ); Chambers, Dead Baby's Mother Faces Criminal Charge on
Acts in Pregnancy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1986, at A22, col. 1 (stating that a pregnant mother was
arrested and charged with "failing to provide medical care to the fetus" after taking marijuana and
amphetamines while pregnant, and failing to quickly summon medical help when she began to
hemorrhage).
26. For example, of the approximately 12 written opinions of the courts which have considered
prosecutions for delivering drugs through the umbilical cord, only one intermediate appellate Flor-
ida court has upheld the theory. In that case, the only woman on the panel issued a vigorous
dissent. See Johnson v. Florida, No. 89-1765, slip op. (Fla. Fifth Dist. Ct. App. April 18, 1991)
appeal docketed. The case is being appealed to the Florida Supreme Court. These 12 opinions do not
include cases decided without published opinions. Judicial decision-making without reasoned and
public justification is questionable. See, e.g., Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished
Opinions and Government Litigants In the United States Court of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940,
941 (1989) (questioning the care and legitimacy of unpublished decision-making by the courts). For
a survey of the longstanding debate on the necessity of written, well reasoned opinions to justify
judicial decisions, see P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSrITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING 1086-118
(1975).
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cuted. What accounts for this new prosecutorial interest in drug-ad-
dicted mothers and their newborns? Prosecutors claim that this flurry of
activity is the result of neutral exercises of their discretion. Yet virtually
all of the prosecutors' offices have been headed by white males; and the
targeted women have been disproportionately poor and minority
mothers.' Does this recent interest reflect genuine concern by white
male prosecutors for the welfare of mostly poor, African-American, His-
panic and a few white infants? Or is this new prosecutorial interest un-
dergirded by bias against the newborns' mothers and by less altruistic
political and economic motives, such as appealing to majoritarian senti-
ments to punish crack/cocaine mothers for burdening society with their
special needs children?2"
The answer to these questions may depend upon whether one views
social phenomena from the top of society or from the bottom.2" In this
27. See Paltrow & Shende, State by State Case Summary of Criminal Prosecutions against Preg-
nant Women and Appendix of Public Health and Public Interest Groups Opposed to These Prosecu-
tions (ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project Memorandum) (May 21, 1991) (on fie with author)
(indicating that of the 55 defendants as of May 21, 1991, whose racial/ethnic background is known,
thirty-two are African-American, twelve are white, two are Latina, and one is Native American).
28. The impression that these prosecutions may be biased is supported by prosecutors' selection
of crack users, who in the media's camera are mostly minorities, as the target defendants, and their
failure to prosecute women for the harms caused by other drugs, most especially alcohol. If the
rationale behind these prosecutions is to punish and deter drug-induced harm to the unborn, then
there should have been prosecutions of women for the well documented harms caused by fetal alco-
hol syndrome (f.a.s.). See Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood, supra note 24, at 1210. F.a.s. perma-
nently and severely damages over 8,000 children a year according to conservative estimates.
Rosenthal, When a Pregnant Woman Drinks, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 30. If
long-term harm to children was the triggering event, this would present the unlikely image of afflu-
ent pregnant white women being subject to arrest at their country clubs or in the suburban home of a
friend for having a drink. Poor black women just do not see this ever happening no matter what the
harm to the unborn. And nuanced distinctions, such as the fact that it is generally only a misde-
meanor to deliver alcohol to a minor, just don't wash that well in the ghetto or barrio. In fact,
pregnant women who drink may be little comforted by the current prosecutions; for prosecutors
could decide that to show evenhandedness they were going to arrest and prosecute pregnant white
women drinking in public restaurants or at country clubs.
29. Some at the bottom see coincidence, fairness and neutral process (whether judicial or explic-
itly political) differently than some at the top. See Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal
Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 324, passim (1987) (suggesting that
experiencing discrimination and feeling the falsity of the liberal American promise creates a special
voice). Those of us who experience America from within the veil of color often perceive racist speech
and stereotyping that goes unnoticed by whites; but which, nevertheless, impacts upon both our
experience and the ways others experience us. Lawrence, supra note **, at 435. Racist speech and
stereotyping is a significant determinant of both who we are and can be within the academy, the
courtroom and beyond. Moreover, many at the bottom are not convinced that the phenomena of
racial disparities in America are the result of minority preferences, merit or neutral qualifications.
Compare City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500-04 (1989) (rejecting claims that
general societal discrimination in an industry plus gross disparity between the general minority pop-
746 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
area, as in others, some perceive traditional biases with respect to gen-
der,30 race and class 3 as having again combined to oppress those at the
bottom differently from those at the top.32 To the extent these prosecu-
ulation and minority firms employed by the city as qualified prime contractors were enough to use
racial quotas) with id. at 532 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
477-78 (1980)) (stating that minority construction contractors had long been denied "'participation
in public contracting opportunities by procurement practices that perpetuated the effects of prior
discrimination'" and thus neutral qualifications merely incorporated past bias). From down under it
appears that what one has and what one gets in America is substantially the result of a rigged game
and not the neutral workings of a fundamentally sound system. Whether women get prosecuted,
and if so which ones, seems to have as much to do with gender, class and race as it does with
whatever harm these mothers are causing, relative to societal and other harms to children which go
unprosecuted and unremedied. Kolata, supra note 8, at A13, col. 1. Prosecuting addicted mothers
may be just more American injustice.
30. See, eg., Roberts, supra note 2, at 1424.
31. See, e-g., Quindlen, Kids In Cars, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1991, § 4, at 19, col. I (reporting
prosecution for vehicular homicide of poor Hispanic man for not using child restraint safety seat
while transporting his sick daughter and suggesting race/cultural bias); Resnick, Car Seat Trial
End, Leaving A Legal Void, Nat'l L.J., May 20, 1991, at 8 (reporting the dismissal of vehicular
homicide charges against Ramiro de Jesus Rodriguez); Unbelted Girl Die= Father Charged In Crash,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1991, at A20, col. 1 (reporting similar prosecution of Angelo Sergi in
Pennsylvania).
32. There are at least two ways in which women at the top are treated differently. First, the
likelihood that women will be reported to authorities by health care professionals depends in part
upon their race and class. According to one study despite slightly more frequent drug use among
white pregnant women than among minority women (15.4% to 14.1%, respectively) there was evi-
dence that minority women were ten times more likely than white women to be reported to state
officials for positive drug tests at the time of birth of their children than drug abusing white women,
including evidence of alcohol toxic syndrome. See Chasnoff, Landress & Barrett, The Prevalence of
llhcit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas
County, Florida, 322 N. ENG. J. MED. 1202 (1990). In addition, better informed affluent women can
create options for themselves which avoid-or at least minimize-the risk of detection and reporting
by leaving jurisdictions where prosecution is likely before delivering their babies. Thus, whether a
woman is criminally prosecuted may depend less on her behavior and more on whether she is black
and treated at the local clinic rather than treated at the Betty Ford Clinic. Similar arguments are
made against state determination of the legality of abortion rights; it reduces the abortion option
only for the immobile poor. Eg., L. TRIBE, ABoRTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 50-51 (1990)
(describing travel option of affluent women seeking abortions).
The second reason why more affluent white women are not prosecuted as often is the focus of this
article. As with drug investigations generally, the police and prosecutors tend to look for wrong-
doing mostly in minority communities. They look on street corners, not in office buildings, for drug
dealing. Cf. Barbieri, Davis Polk Drug Case Over?, Manhattan Lawyer, Oct. 20, 1987, at 7 (reporting
how Davis Polk & Wardwell hired a private investigator to handle its in-house drug problem). This
skews both the perception and reality of police and prosecutorial efforts. For example, there appears
to be little effort by prosecutors to encourage or force private health care providers to test and report
affluent (mostly white) women for the harm caused to their unborn or newly born by alcoholism,
cocaine addiction or other prenatal toxins. While this author would not support such efforts, if
prosecutors were really serious about uniformly enforcing the law, they could use the same under-
cover tactics so frequently employed in minority communities to infiltrate private medical care facili-
ties and collect evidence of affluent patient drug use and willful or systemic failures in testing and
reporting. Prosecutors seem to feel that the problem of crack and heroine addicted poor mothers
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tions are based upon the pernicious-albeit in the case of some prosecu-
tors unconscious and unintentional-influences of gender, race and class,
these prosecutions of drug-addicted women are paradigms in two senses.
First, these prosecutions illustrate the general dangers of prosecutors
having too much discretion and too little accountability.33 In this aspect,
the problem of the prosecution of drug-addicted mothers is illustrative of
the general dilemma of how to limit, structure and check even necessary
prosecutorial discretion.3 4  Second, there are unique problems arising
from the possible sexism, racism, and classism in these exercises of
prosecutorial discretion.35 This article shall assay these various concerns
and advance reforms to improve the quality of prosecutorial justice and
our knowledge about how prosecutors are actually executing their office.
B. The General Need to Check Prosecutorial Discretion
We have to open our eyes to the reality that justice to individual parties is
administered more outside courts than in them, and we have to penetrate the
... areas of discretionary determinations by police and prosecutors ... where
huge concentrations of injustice invite drastic reforms. 6
There are many, many crimes on the books. Indeed, social behavior
has been grossly overcriminalized.37 There are more crimes on the books
demand intervention with criminal investigations and sanctions, while behavior which similarly
harms the children of the affluent, whether from crack, cocaine, alcohol or other harmful drugs, is
appropriately treated as a private medical matter. Because this discrimination is in part hidden by
prosecutorial discretion, there has been no public debate on the policy choices being made by prose-
cutors. Similar perceptions and problems arise where the targets are poor minority males. See
Greene, Drug Decriminalization: A Chorus in Need of Masterrap's Voice, 18 HoFsrRA L. REv. 457,
nn.62 & 65 (1990) (reporting perception that the "war on drugs" is a war on minority males).
33. This article is not primarily concerned with whether being addicted and pregnant can be a
crime consistent with the Constitution. This article assumes arguendo that prosecutors have or could
be provided by legislatures specific and constitutional statutory authorization to prosecute women
because they ingest illegal substances during pregnancy. The problem focused upon in this article is
whether the current lack of constraints on prosecutorial discretion creates excessive potential for
abusive and pernicious decision-making.
34. Any discretion not necessary to the prosecutorial function should be eliminated by the legis-
lature. Prosecutors should have no more power than is necessary. See, e.g., K.C. DAVIS, DiscRE-
TIONARY JUSTICE 53-96, passim (1969).
35. Prosecutorial discretion may have long been exercised against women because of their class
standing. See, eg., F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5-6 (1964) (describing the
practice of prosecuting prospective mothers for extramarital sexual relations when they are without
the financial resources to pay for the medical expenses of childbirth or subsequent care of children).
In this particular area, the perception is that racial bias is operating. Kg., Roberts, supra note 2, at
1432; Kolata, supra note 8.
36. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 34, at 215.
37. See LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532, 533-
39 (1970). Like the horribly destructive consequences which can follow prosecution of drug-ad-
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than there are police, prosecutors, judges and jails available to enforce
them. 8 And even if there were adequate resources available, the applica-
tion and administrative interpretation of these laws is at least as impor-
tant as their enactment or judicial interpretation.39 Additionally, some
state agent must assay whether there is sufficient evidence to go forward.
Thus some governmental process and decisionmakers must decide which
behavior will be subjected to criminal process.4°
This composite is what former New York Chief Judge Breitel
phrased the "power to consider all circumstances and then determine
what legal action is to be taken."4 1 Enter discretionary criminal law en-
forcement, the "inescapable responsibility for exercising discretion." 42
While the sage observations of Chief Judge Breitel, himself a former
prosecutor, are sound, it does not follow that this "inescapable responsi-
bility" of the prosecutor need be given carte blanche. Prosecutors' roles
in the criminal justice system are far too pivotal as the gatekeeper to the
American courthouses and the primary architects of criminal law en-
forcement policy to allow 'inadequate information and review to
continue.43
dicted mothers, a tragic West Virginia case illustrates the potential harm caused by overreliance on
criminal sanctions to solve intimate human problems. In this case a man was prosecuted for his
attempt to commit suicide and sentenced to six months in jail. While in jail he killed himself. Man
Hangs Self in Jail Cell, Wash. Times, Feb. 4, 1991, at A6. As with the prosecution of drug.addicted
pregnant women, this prosecutor used the crude club of criminal law enforcement in an attempt to
coerce compliance and deter human despair. What was needed was not criminal sanctions but the
healing, reconstitutive salve of human love, caring and support-the resurrection of hope. The
moral crime committed was the prosecution, not the attempted suicide.
38. Eg., Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1521, 1525,
1548 (1981).
39. Id. at 1521 n.1 ("The Law is written by legislators, interpreted occasionally by appellate
courts, but applied by countless individuals, each acting largely for himself. How it is applied out-
weighs in importance its enactment or its interpretation.")(quoting Baker, The Prosecutor - Initiation
of Prosecution, 23 J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 770, 796 (1933)).
40. Prosecution for crime was not always the responsibility of a public official. In England, even
during the colonial period, prosecutions were regularly the responsibility of the private party ag-
grieved by the alleged criminal behavior. See, eg., J. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A
SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 3 (1980); W. SEYMOUR, UNITED STATES ATrrONEY: AN INSIDE VIEW OF
"JUSTICE" IN AMERICA UNDER THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION 20 (1975).
41. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 427, 427 (1960).
42. Id. at 432.
43. Similarly, the discretion of police need not be given carte blanche. Exercises of police dis-
cretion play a critical threshold role in deciding which crimes are to be prosecuted. K.C. DAVIS,
supra note 34, at 84-90; Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low- Visibil-
ity Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L. J. 543, 556-557 (1960). And the potential
abuses inherent in police discretion are exacerbated when race is a factor in their decision-making.
Eg., Note, Developments in the Law; Race and the Criminal Process: Race and the Prosecutor's
Charging Decision, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1520, 1521 (1988) [hereinafter Developments in the Law -
1991] PROSECUTION OF DRUG-ADDICTED MOTHERS 749
At the threshold, if the prosecutor's office refuses to prosecute cases
of a particular type, the police are effectively blocked from proceeding
beyond arrest into the courtroom." Moreover, in many areas, including
the prosecution of pregnant drug addicts, it is the prosecutor who sug-
gests the direction of investigative inquiry" and the collection of the data
on which criminal prosection is predicated' for the police and other pos-
sible reporters.g7 Determining which crimes get prosecuted is not nearly
Race and the Prosecutor's Charging Decision]; Note, Program Budgeting for Police Departments, 76
YALE L.J. 822, 823, 827-88 (1967). Yet with respect to crimes that do not call for immediate police
responses, such as non-street crimes, prosecutors can be the principal architects of the focus of crimi-
nal law enforcement. See, eg., Bubany & Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Administrative Law for
Prosecutorial Decision-Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473, 476-78 (1976) (stating that prosecutors,
as the most powerful figures in criminal administration, have the freedom to choose which criminal
code violations to prosecute although technically their duty is to pursue all violations of the criminal
code. This freedom is viewed as "uncontrolled" decision-making).
44. Cf. Manhattan Neighborhoods, Newsday, Feb. 13, 1991, at 23 (reporting Manhattan District
Attorney's refusal to prosecute bystander case where police selected African-American man out of
more than 150 predominantly white bystanders). This refusal by the District Attorney is both office
policy and consistent with a federal court order barring bystander arrests. See Pitt, Lawyers Say
Officers Ignore Order on Bystanders, N.Y. Times, Sep. 28, 1990, at BI, col. 2; Pitt, Police Reinstate
Rules on Bystander Arrests, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1990, at 46, col. 1 (reporting that the New York City
Police department reissued guidelines on the legal rights of bystanders peacefully criticizing police
operations).
45. In Ms. Hardy's case, the prosecutor received information from an area hospital that Hardy's
newborn tested positive for cocaine. There is no indication that all newborns were tested and if
tested, reported. Hoffman, supra note 11, at 35, 44.
46. In the area of prosecuting drug-addicted mothers, the medical and scientific research and
publication communities bear some responsibility for bias in the underlying data and, consequently,
for prosecutorial and public misperceptions. First, funding and publishing decisions are prejudiced
against research intended to show there may be no demonstrable adverse effects of cocaine during
pregnancy. The scientific community and its mainstream publishers have decided a priori that only
those studies which affirm their prejudices should be funded and published. See, eg., Bias Against
the Null Hypothesis: The Reproductive Hazards of Cocaine, THE LANCET 1440 (1989). Second, in
medical research there is a bias against including women and minorities in studies for fear they
might distort the "normal," meaning white male, result. Kolata, In Medical Research Equal Oppor-
tunity Doesn't Always Apply, N.Y.Times, March 10, 1991, § 4, at 16, col. 1 (reporting on the exclu-
sion of women and minorities from medical research studies, including heart research). See C.
CLINTON, THE OTHER CIVIL WAR: AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 150-52
(1984) (noting that the entire structure of medicine is biased because it treats women as special,
gynecological, and male as normal). Yet notably this ordinary bias against including women and
minorities is reversed in the area of illegal drug use where the research samples are structured to
include disproportionate numbers of minority women. See Chasnoff, supra note 32. Gender and
race-based stereotyping may account for this reversal. To the medical research establishment, poor
colored women may be natural subjects for research on illegal drug use.
47. The concept is borrowed from statutes requiring the repoting of child abuse. Eg., CAL.
PEN. CODE § 11166(a) (West 1991) (stating that certain persons who know or reasonably suspect a
child to have been the victim of child abuse shall report the child abuse instance to the proper
authorities); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 413 (McKinney 1990).
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as reactive a process as some prosecutors would have the public believe.48
Prosecutors are proactive gatekeepers to the courts and jails and impor-
tant determinants in law enforcement because they choose courses of ac-
tion or inaction.4 9
As identified by Davis,5" there are three sources of a prosecutor's
discretionary power: (1) purposeful legislative delegations, (2) vague
statutory terms which administrators must define, and (3) public acquies-
cence in administrative assumption of ungranted power. The third cate-
gory identified by Davis is the greatest source of potential abuse since it
amounts to the unbridled and unchecked power to decide whether to
investigate and then to prosecute x over y, when both could be investi-
gated and prosecuted. However, the first two categories are sources of
potential abuse as well.
The first source of prosecutorial discretion is where the legislature
purposefully delegates discretion to prosecutors. This may be done for
many reasons, the most common being (a) the legislature does not have
the time or competence to set forth the rules or administrative regula-
tions in every area required and (b) the legislature may not have the
political will or ability to precisely define the contours for administering
or allocating resources within the criminal justice system.51 Illustrative
48. See eg., Anderson, Thornburgh on the Record, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 56 (reporting Attor-
ney General Thornburgh's comments to the effect that the government did not prejudicially select
former Mayor Marion Barry of Washington, D.C. for prosecution because the government enforces
the law whenever it has been violated). There may have been good, non-political, non-racially biased
reasons for prosecuting Mayor Barry; but it is sheer duplicity to suggest that he was not targeted for
investigation and prosecution as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
49. K.C. DAvIS, supra note 34, at 4.
50. Davis's essay remains the best treatment of prosecutorial discretion. However, it suffers
from some substantial defects which are only touched upon here. See, eg., Goldstein & Marcus, The
Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three " Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87
YALE L.J. 240, 275-76 (1977) (disputing Davis's claim that certain European controls on
prosecutorial discretion are effective). But see Langbein & Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure:
"Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE LJ. 1549, 1564 (1978).
First, it is questionable to what extent lessons from administrative law are applicable to criminal
proceedings. Even lessons drawn from the criminal enforcement of I.R.S., S.E.C., antitrust, and
labor laws may not transplant well to non-business areas. Second, Davis assumes the primary prob-
lem with prosecutorial discretion is the denial of individual justice. While this may be a primary
problem, certainly the view from the bottom is that biases based on group characteristics, such as
gender, class and race, are also candidates for primacy. Compare Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1555
(suggesting that group-based biases are among the most pernicious potential dangers of unbridled
prosecutorial discretion). Davis also misunderstands the view from the bottom when he miscon-
strues civil disobedience by civil rights groups. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 34, at 28 (suggesting that
such groups would oppose the statement that "the rule of law is preferable to that of any
individual").
51. The government has been held to have discretionary power to proceed against only "major"
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of (a) might be broadly phrased child abuse statutes where the potentially
offensive behavior might be best left to the enforcing authorities to re-
solve, subject to constraining due process judicial review for adequate
notice.52 Illustrative of (b) might be the legislative inability to prune the
criminal code to eliminate those crimes for which there is no longer the
public will to enforce. Adultery and possibly marijuana possession may
fall into these categories.53
The second source of prosecutorial discretion may arise from inten-
tional vagueness necessary to obtain passage of the law,54 or inability to
wisely anticipate the various criminal circumstances to be encountered
with sufficient particularity and clairvoyance to do justice. As to both of
these sources of prosecutorial discretion, greater legislative clarity may
generally be a false hope since prosecutors must give meaning to some-
what vague statutes through application to actual facts. Legislatures
could end these prosecutions by clearly stating that such prosecutions are
not authorized. Yet in the political environment of the "war on drugs"
this would not appear likely without a clear factual case against such
prosecutions having been made. Building such factual cases is one possi-
ble project for the Boards, suggested in Part IV.
The third source of prosecutorial discretion is the power to be selec-
tive.55 Federal or state prosecutors are virtually never compelled by
common law or statute to prosecute any particular instance of criminal
violators where there were insufficient resources to proceed against all violators. Moog Industries v.
FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
52. See, eg., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939) (reversing conviction under
statute which criminalized being a "gangster").
53. The difficulty in decriminalizing anything was recently illustrated in Connecticut where
adultery was decriminalized only after it was realized that prosecutorial discretion rendered the law
null except in cases where the adultery statute was used by vindictive spouses. Johnson, Bill to Void
Adultery Laws to Go to Weicker, N.Y. Times, April 4, 1991, at B7, col. 1.
54. K.C. DAvis, supra note 34, at 49.
55. The power to be selective, the screening power, was eloquently discussed by Justice Jackson
when he was Attorney General. He said:
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person
in America. His discretion is tremendous. He can have citizens investigated and, if he is
that kind of person, he can have this done to the tune of public statements and veiled or
unveiled intimations. Or the prosecutor may choose a more subtle course and simply
have a citizen's friends interviewed.... He may dismiss the case before trial, in which
case the defense never has a chance to be heard.... If the prosecutor is obliged to choose
his cases, it follows that he can choose his defendants .... [A] prosecutor stands a fair
chance of finding at least a technical violation of some act on the part of almost any-
one.... It is in this realm - in which the prosecutor picks some person whom he dislikes
or desires to embarrass, or selects some group of unpopular persons and then looks for an
offense, that the greatest danger of abuse of prosecution power lies.
K.C. DAVIs, supra note 34, at 190 (citing 24 J. AMER. Jun. Soc. 18-19 (1940) (emphasis added).
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behavior. 6 Generally speaking, prosecutors may exercise individual will
in deciding which cases to bring before magistrates, or grand or petit
juries.5 7 As with virtually any other discretionary governmental act,
such power can be abused and thus should be and is to some extent sub-
ject to checks on the abusive, arbitrary and possibly unconstitutional ex-
ercise of that power." The need to limit discretion is the primary
concern of this article. Prosecutorial discretion is troublesome both be-
cause of its generally unconstrained nature and because minority and
gendered voices are underrepresented in the policy making of prosecu-
tors' offices.
Ordinarily, prosecutorial decision-making, entailing some or all
three of these varieties of discretion, proceeds through several precharg-
ing phases, each of which can contribute to the scope of prosecutorial
discretion and the potential for prosecutorial abuse: interpretation of the
law, determining the sufficiency of the evidence, and deciding which
charges should be brought.
(1) Interpretation. Prosecutors must first interpret law, for if prose-
cutors conclude that a law does not apply to a fact pattern, no matter
what the police or other investigators conclude, the case will never get to
court. Only those cases the prosecutor concludes fall within a criminal
prohibition ever make it further in the criminal process. And usually, it
is not until the case gets to court that there is any effective check on the
prosecutor's interpretation of law. As stated earlier, there remains a sub-
stantial question as to whether prosecutors are properly interpreting and
56. This source of prosecutorial discretion is the focus of much of Davis's critique and his sug-
gested "reform" to a more Germanic system. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 34, at 191-195. Commentary
on Davis's proposal has both disputed the accuracy of his reporting and interpretation of the Ger-
man system and questioned whether it would be a sensible reform here. See Goldstein & Marcus,
supra note 50.
57. This is not to say that within a particular prosecutor's office each individual who is a prose-
cutor has unfettered discretion. In large offices, and particularly in the federal system, individual
assistants are at least theoretically supposed to operate within policy guidelines. However, most
prosecutors' offices are small, see J. EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATED 4-8 (1978).
Even in large organizations, the degree of individual discretion can be immense. Moreover, in larger
organizations, the head prosecuting attorney has tremendous discretion to exercise (usually) his (not
her) will to prosecute whatever cases he chooses. Once formal charges have been brought, fre-
quently the prosecutor is no longer free to decide not to prosecute without the permission of the
court. In the federal system, for example, once there has been a grand jury indictment, the prosecu-
tor must then petition the court to allow a nolle prosequi. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a); e.g., Rinaldi v.
United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 n.15 (1977); United States v. Salinas, 693 F.2d 348, 351-52 (5th Cir.
1982).
58. See K.C. DAVIS, supra note 34, at 80-96. The current constraints on prosecutorial discre-
tion are discussed below.
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applying the statutes under which drug-addicted mothers are being
prosecuted. 9
(2) Sufficiency of Evidence. While prosecutors are ethically obli-
gated not to bring cases which they know are not supported by probable
cause, 6° this still leaves much latitude for prosecutorial discretion. 1
There is no requirement, for example, that prosecutors believe that there
is sufficient evidence to convict someone before charging them with a
crime.62 And the gap between probable cause and proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt can be wide indeed.63 The determination of whether to go
forward with a criminal case based on the available evidence is largely a
function of prosecutorial discretion, here meaning, the judgment call on
whether the case is winnable before a fact finder, jury or judge.61 Factors
of race and class can greatly influence this determination because in
America the amount of evidence required to convict can depend on the
59. See supra notes 21, 22, 25, 26 and accompanying text.
60. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(A) (1980). A finding of prob-
able cause requires a determination both that the law can be applied to the facts and that there is
sufficient evidence the defendant probably committed the crime.
61. See generally Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1547-48 (implying that prosecutorial discretion is
not only based on the evidence presented but also entails the likelihood of successful conviction and
whether possible conviction is worth the resources required).
62. The ABA Standards do state that "[a] prosecutor should not institute, cause to be insti-
tuted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible
evidence to support a conviction." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSnCE Standard 3-3.9(a) (1986).
The application of these standards is not entirely clear. For example, surely the Standards do not
intend to suggest that it is improper for a prosecutor to permit the pendency of criminal charges
while the process of collecting evidence is properly ongoing. This is precisely what goes on in the
typical case where arrest is the triggering event for a prosecution. Thus the ABA Standard must
mean that the prosecutor cannot permit continued prosecution where the prosecutor knows, or
should have known, of the absence of sufficient admissible evidence. In any event, there may be no
sanction for violating these standards. M. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER'S ETHICS 222
(1990) (concluding that there are no penalties for prosecutors who violate the ABA standards).
63. Rudolph Giuliani, the former United States Attorney, has discovered it is much easier to
indict Bess Meyerson, Imelda Marcos and others than it is to convict them. Roberts, Giuliani De-
fends Past in Assessing Political Future, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1991, at 1, col. 1.
64. See generally Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion - A Comment, 60 NW. U.L. REv. 174,
176-180 (1965) (noting that the prosecution of criminal cases would almost never be commenced
unless the chances of conviction seemed better than fair). In theory, either a judicial officer or a
grand jury reviews evidence to assure that there is sufficient basis for the probable cause determina-
tion. And while there is some debate within legal communities as to the efficiency and efficacy of the
grand jury or preliminary hearing as checks on prosecutorial discretion, they can be effective only if
defendants have meaningful access to counsel to prepare their cases before the grand jury or prelimi-
nary hearing judge. Such counsel is not likely to be available for poor, minority, drug-addicted
women.
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defendant's race and class.65 Given that sufficiency of the evidence,
above the minimum required by law, is a question of what is enough to
get a local jury to convict, in areas like the prosecution of drug-addicted
women the likely demographics of the jury could affect which cases get
prosecuted. To the extent that prosecutors and juries believe that poor
and minority women are more likely to be abusive mothers than are afflu-
ent white women, poor and minority women are likely to be prosecuted
and convicted on less evidence. This is an unfair systemic bias.
(3) Which Charges, if Any, for Which Persons - Tailoring the Crimi-
nal Justice System. Often there are a range of charges which potentially
could be brought against a defendant. For example, with pregnant drug
addicts, the prosecutor might be able to charge a woman with drug pos-
session,66 distribution,67 and/or abuse and neglect of the unborn or
newly born child.6" The prosecutor's power is very much the power to
decide which charges, if any, to bring.69 For example, in those states
65. Id at 184-85 (suggesting that less proof of criminal conduct was necessary in narcotics
cases where defendants were persons from lower socio-economic classes).
66. Green v. State, 260 Ga. 625, 398 S.E.2d 360 (1990) (holding that although no contraband
was found on accused, evidence of cocaine metabolites in urine analysis was sufficient evidence of
drug possession), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2059 (1991). Cf York, Documents Detail Case Against
Barry: A Dozen Ready to Testify They Saw Drug UsA Court Papers Say, Wash. Post, May 8, 1990, at
Al, col. 2 (reporting that prosecutors would use chemical analysis of Washington Mayor Marion
Barry's hair as evidence to demonstrate repeated cocaine use by the mayor).
67. See supra note 26.
68. See supra note 25.
69. In the federal system, with its recent sentencing "reform" limiting the discretion of judges,
the power of prosecutors theoretically has been increased. Today, the power to charge may be far
more determinative of the ultimate sentence than it was under the prior system. S. SHANE-DuBow,
A. BROWN & E. OLSEN, SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 10-11 (1985) (arguing that
judicial discretion at the sentencing stages has virtually been replaced by unfettered prosecutorial
discretion at the charging stage); Developments in the Law - Race and the Prosecutor's Charging
Decision, supra note 43, at 1521 (arguing that prosecutorial discretion in the charging phase is virtu-
ally unchecked and that there is room for racial bias to enter the decision-making process); Note,
Developments in the Law; Race and the Criminal Process Race and Noncapital Sentencing, 101
HARv. L. REv. 1626, 1640-41 (1988) (arguing that the federal sentencing guidelines' presumptive
determinate sentencing method has in effect replaced judicial discretion at the sentencing stages with
unfettered prosecutorial discretion in their charging decisions). Prosecutors are not externally ac-
countable for these exercises of discretion. Yet this critique is tempered by: 1) the non-litigable
policy of the Department of Justice, which predates the sentencing guidelines, of requiring govern-
ment attorneys to charge the defendant with the most serious crime consistent with conduct that is
likely to result in a sustainable conviction, and 2) the current requirement that minimum charges
filed not drop below that which would allow imposition of the guideline sentence after a conviction.
UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION 16 (1980). The point
would still remain that, should the executive choose not to limit itself, as many state prosecutors
have not, no other body is in a position to even report the use of discretion to the public for
evaluation.
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which enhance penalties for criminals with prior records, the prosecutor
must generally decide whether to charge a person with a prior felony
record as a predicate felon.7"
A prosecutor, faced with a range of potential charges, and perhaps
the decision of whether to charge someone as a predicate felon, must
decide if the particular prosecution will do more harm to the individual
than good for society. For example, in one case it might be argued that
labelling a pregnant woman a criminal might hurt her, her offspring and
society more than allowing other social support and punitive mecha-
nisms to come into play. Thus the prosecutor might not want to prose-
cute a pregnant drug-addicted doctor because such a prosecution might
ruin her career, reduce the child's chances for as good a life as possible
and increase the burden on society with very little offsetting deterrent
effect.71 On the other hand, from the prosecutor's perspective, how else
can he deter poor black women other than by sending them to jail? In
making these decisions the difference between rich and poor, well con-
nected or not, along with prosecutorial bias, can be crucial.
The availability of prosecutorial justice is frequently determined by
the resources available to the potential target. For instance, "white col-
lar" suspects frequently learn of potential prosecution in advance
through witnesses who have been interviewed or subpoenaed, like their
private medical doctor or health care facility. These suspects then hire
well-paid criminal defense lawyers with social, political and professional
access to the prosecutor's office to argue at case screening conferences
against instituting criminal charges or to lessen the seriousness of the
crimes to be charged.72
70. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 70.10 (McKinney 1978); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (Vernon
1974); Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1529.
71. Female medical doctors or residents who spend long hours on their feet are at a higher risk
of having low birth weight, premature babies. Miller, Katz & Cefalo, Pregnancies Among Physicians:
A Historical Cohort Study, 34 . REPROD. MED. 790 (1989). In effect, these doctors run some of the
same significant risks in having babies, as do women who have not received adequate prenatal care
and pregnant drug-addicted women. If the prenatal behavior of drug-addicted mothers can be sub-
ject to state control through criminal sanctions, could these pregnant doctors also be subject to some
state control because of the effects of their behavior on their unborn? If the answer to this question is
of course not, then why treat the potentially harmful behavior of one group differently from that of
the other? If the trigger which justifies state intervention and control is the potential harm to the
unborn, the justification should apply equally to both groups.
72. This is an area where access to well-connected legal counsel prior to formal charges being
filed either in court or through a grand jury can be critical. See J. EISENSTE1N, supra note 57, at 171-
78 (suggesting that the reputation and influential status of certain private attorneys may be of great
significance in the revealing of evidence by the prosecutor before trial); cf. W. SEYMOUR, supra note
40, at 60.
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Typically, there is no record made of these conferences, nor is there
any public disclosure of the content of the meeting or a written memo-
randum reflecting the reason for exercising prosecutorial discretion. The
potential for pernicious, albeit at times unconscious, discrimination in
making the decision whether to prosecute is obvious and substantial. .In
the aggregate, these kinds of contacts can skew the impact of
prosecutorial discretion away from the privileged and towards the so-
cially, politically and economically disadvantaged, as is the case with
drug-addicted women being prosecuted.
At a more formal level, often after making a rather preliminary as-
sessment of the potential charges which could be brought against some-
one and the evidence which might support such charges, a prosecutor
has the option to initiate but then discontinue prosecution, usually on
condition that the defendant not engage in any criminal conduct for
some period of time. Here again access to effective advocacy can be
crucial.
In such situations, prosecutors have the option to stop the criminal
process at the door to the courthouse even where there is sufficient evi-
dence to convict. Typically such declinations or diversions are invoked
for first time or minor violators where it is determined by the prosecutor
that some alternative to prosecution will better serve the defendant and
society. In the federal system these programs are typically referred to as
deferred prosecutions73 and under some state law, as adjournment in
contemplation of dismissal.74 In either case, there is substantial discre-
tion whether to provide this option to a defendant and again, the un-
checked potential for pernicious abuse is currently hidden from any
public scrutiny. If there are less dollars than would be required to prose-
cute all of the potential violations coming to the prosecutor's attention,
then the prosecutor must decide to which cases limited law enforcement
resources will be allocated."5 Given scarce resources and no guidance
from the legislature or courts, prosecutors will establish priorities consis-
tent with their own agendas. 6 And even though politics,77 race, gender
73. United States v. Lockwood, 382 F. Supp. 1111, 1114 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
74. N.Y. CRIm. PROC. LAW § 170.55 (McKinney 1982).
75. Eg., Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges" A Quantitative Study of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. Cm. L. REv. 246, 247 (1980); Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1548-49.
76. W. SEYMOUR, supra note 40, at 58-59; Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1548-49(suggesting that
most prosecutorial resource allocative decisions are the result of a haphazard process).
77. Under the ABA "the prosecutor should give no weight to personal or political advantages or
disadvantages which might be involved or to a desire to enhance his [or her] record of conviction."
STANDARD FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-3.9(c)(1986). But see J. EISENSTEIN, supra note 57,
at 152-53 (stating that prosecutors seek high rates of conviction to enhance their credibility and
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or class should not enter into this decision-making process, if it does, and
the prosecutor is not aware of his racism or gender bias,78 then these
factors contribute to abuse.79 Assuming that the executive function of
prosecutors has all of these potential sources of abuse, what are the con-
straints on prosecutorial discretion? This is the subject of Part II.
II. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
/T.he idea that a prosecuting attorney should be permitted to use his discre-
tion concerning the law which he will enforce and those which he will disre-
gard [should appear] to the ordinary citizen to border on anarchy.80
Two views on the scope of prosecutorial discretion are rivals: (a)
there are attractive rationales for retaining broad prosecutorial discre-
tionary power, versus (b) current constraints on prosecutorial discretion
are anemic, particularly with respect to real and perceived gender, class
and race biases.
A. Attempts to Justify the Status Quo: Should Prosecutorial Discretion
Be So Unconstrained?
Attempts to justify the extent of unconstrained prosecutorial discre-
tion have been predicated upon three related rationales: first, separation
of powers; second, prosecutorial expertise; and third, efficiency concerns
with respect to the criminal justice process. All of these have been dis-
cussed elsewhere and so only a cursory discussion will be undertaken
here.81
One of the clearest rationalizations for the judiciary's refusal to
compel prosecutions was offered by the late District Judge Lloyd Mac-
reputation and to appease pressure usually exerted by the local legislature and judiciary); Destefano
& Moses, Rudy Giuliani At A Turning Point, Newsday, Jan. 29, 1989, (Magazine), at 8 (reporting
that former U.S. attorney, Rudy Giuliani, often prosecuted cases because of their perceived press or
political value).
78. Cf. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (stating that a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimi-
nation is influenced by unconscious racial motivation).
79. The potential for abusive prosecutorial discretion arises in other areas as well. For example,
bail recommendations and plea negotiations and terms are greatly impacted upon by discretionary
prosecutorial decisions. See Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1533-34 (on plea negotiations). These
other very significant aspects of potential prosecutorial injustice are not discussed here because with
respect to drug-addicted women and many other potential defendants, the most critical issue is
whether prosecutions should be initiated at all and not what the ultimate disposition of cases should
be.
80. Arnold, Law Enforcement: An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1932).
81. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 34; Developments in Law - Race and the Prosecutor's Charging
Decision, supra note 43; Vorenberg, supra note 38.
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Mahon. He relied upon a rather simplistic version of the separation of
powers doctrine:
[I]t is not the business of the Courts to tell the [prosecutor] to perform what
[the courts] conceive to be his duties. Article II, Section 3 of the Constitu-
tion, provides that 'the President shall take Care the Laws shall be faith-
fully executed.' The prerogative of enforcing the criminal law was vested
by the Constitution, therefore, not in the Courts, nor in private citizens, but
squarely in the executive arm of government. [This Presidential power was
legislatively conferred on the United States Attorney.] The federal courts
are powerless to interfere with his discretionary power. The Court cannot
compel him to prosecute ... whatever his reason is for not acting.82
Yet even accepting for the sake of argument that this is a sound
doctrinal view of separation of powers, 3 it does not justify the current
acquiescence to prosecutorial discretion. While prosecutorial function
requires some discretion, courts should not permit prosecutors any more
discretion than is necessary. 4 Moreover, while the separation of powers
doctrine prevents the courts from compelling prosecutors to act, it does
not prevent courts from intervening when prosecutors act unequally, as
with racially motivated actions.8"
As part of the prosecutor's unique executive function, some have
argued that .there is a need for confidentiality which should preclude pub-
lic oversight and judicial or legislative review. The need for confidential-
ity, however, is not a sufficient reason to prevent review of prosecutorial
discretion. In reviewing prosecutorial action, there is rarely a need to
reveal details of specific cases to the public. Any review of individual
82. Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (MacMahon, J.) (emphasis sup-
plied). Accord Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379 (2d Cir.
1973); Peek v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1970). Cf. Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 85-87
(1981)(per curiam) (holding over dissent that private citizens and jailed inmates lack judicially cog-
nizable interests in whether prison guards are prosecuted for criminal civil rights violations for beat-
ing the plaintiff inmates). Compare Becker, Judicial Scrutiny of Prosecutorial Discretion in the
Decision Not to File a Complain4 71 MARQ. L. REv. 749, 766 (1988) (stating that Wisconsin courts
previously had the power to initiate criminal proceedings if the local prosecutor was unwilling to do
so).
83. Separation of powers doctrine is and ought to be far more complex than is reflected in Judge
MacMahon's view. For an example of the better scholarship conceptualizing the prosecutor as ad-
ministrator, see generally Bubany & Skillem, supra note 43, at 477 n.20, 495-505 (1976). Although
lodged squarely in the realm of the modem administrative state, Professor Edley's recent effort il-
luminates the normative strength of separation of powers doctrine and some of the recognized de-
fects of its formalism as a theory of governance. C. EDLEY, JR., ADMINwsrRATIvE LAw 13-95
(1990).
84. K.C. DAviS, supra note 34, at 58.
85. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).
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non-public case files could be the function of a Board or its staffs.86
Nor does the expertise of prosecutors justify granting them unfet-
tered discretion any more than it would for any other expert executive or
administrator.17 The courts certainly have limited other discretionary
executive functions when confronted with racist or sexist policies and
practices.8 And while the prosecutorial function takes into account
many intangible factors including administration, resource allocation,
case evaluation and assessment, equity, fairness, and justice, which make
judicial review difficult, these legitimate bases for granting prosecutors
some discretion also reveal the potential for abuse. Prosecutors could
readily rely upon, albeit perhaps unconsciously, improper considerations,
including racist, sexist or classist stereotypes or other forms of pluralistic
ignorance.8 9  This should be guarded against, notwithstanding
prosecutorial expertise. Yet the courts, especially the federal judiciary,
are feeble. Current federal doctrine, reinforced by the judiciary's
demographics and life experiences shared with prosecutors, make the
86. In cases where security is a genuine concern, there should be no need for prosecutors to
reveal an informant's name or any other information which would put an informant's life in jeopardy
or undermine ongoing investigations. Judicial intermediation might be necessary in such cases, with
sealed testimony, available only to a reviewing court.
87. As Judge Bazelon and Justice Black have argued in several eloquent dissents, prosecutors
should have less discretion given the uniquely important liberty interests at stake. Cf Berra v. U.S.,
351 U.S. 131, 139 (1956) (Black, J., dissenting) (giving prosecutor unreviewable discretion to decide
"whether the judge and jury must punish identical conduct as a felony or a misdemeanor" is ques-
tionable); Henderson v. U.S., 349 F.2d 712, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (noting
potential abuse when prosecutor treats violators of the same crime differently, on the unfounded
contention that drug addicts are probably involved in "bigger stuff," and therefore warrant harsher
sentences); Hutcherson v. U.S., 345 F.2d 964, 973-74 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting)
(choosing to prosecute under a federal statute instead of a state statute is actually choosing a mini-
mum 10 year sentence, rather than a maximum 10 year sentence, without either sentencing informa-
tion or expertise in sentencing).
88. Eg., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89
(1986) (holding prosecutor's discretionary use of peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors on
account of race violated the core guarantee of equal protection). See, ag., Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding school's discretionary policy of not admitting men
as matriculated students to state's only nursing school required "exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion" particularly given that its effect was to perpetuate stereotypes about nursing which depressed
women's wages).
89. See O'GoRMAN, supra note 4 and accompanying text. Research released in January of 1991
by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago and sponsored by the Na-
tional Science Foundation, found that white Americans still believe, often unconsciously, in very
racist stereotypes about blacks and Hispanics with respect to laziness, tendency to commit acts of
violence, intelligence and national loyalty. T. Smith, Ethnic Images 5 (General Social Survey Topical
Report No. 19) (Released Jan. 8, 1991). There is no reason to believe that prosecutors as a group are
free from such thinking. Indeed, given the skewed populations to which they are exposed, prosecu-
tors may be more prone to such stereotyping.
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current judiciary an inhospitable forum, hard of hearing toward outsider
voices and in general anemic centurions of justice.
B. The Current Inadequate Constraints: The Courts, the Legislature,
the Electorate
Theoretically, there are several checks available to limit abuses in
prosecutorial discretion. First, decisions to prosecute are subject to judi-
cial oversight. Second, prosecutorial discretion may be legislatively con-
trolled by pruning criminal statutes, setting priorities for prosecutorial
budgets, providing less vague standards and creating or requiring the cre-
ation of written guidelines, policies and procedures. Finally, prosecutors
are accountable to the electorate, directly' or indirectly.91 None of these
theoretical checks are likely to provide poor, minority, drug-addicted
women much actual protection from abusive prosecutors.
i. The Anemic Judiciary
Absolute discretion means unchecked and unreviewable discretion. When no
other authority can reverse the choice made, even if it is arbitrary and unrea-
sonable, discretion is absolute.92
Prosecutors are virtually free at the critical early stages in the crimi-
nal law process to do as they please.93 The judiciary gives only lip service
to constraining prosecutorial discretion.9" There are no effective judi-
90. Currently, forty-four states hold elections for the office of prosecutor. See, eg., MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 168.191 (West 1989).
91. This is the case with respect to federal prosecutors, who are accountable to the United States
Attorney General and through that officer to the President. The Congress can exercise control
through its advise and consent function. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654 (1988). Congress may also initiate impeachment proceedings. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5;
Chandler v. Judicial Council of 10th Cir., 398 U.S. 74 (1970). The most direct form of control stems
from Congressional choice of the wording and the scope of criminal statutes.
92. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 34, at 151-52.
93. To constrain this discretion, Davis suggests courts mandate prosecutors to articulate rules
or standards. These rules need not be in the form of generalizations, but rather hypotheticals leaving
latitude for further development over time. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 34, at 60. Davis's suggestion
might not prevent injustice in cases not covered by hypotheticals, but his suggestion could facilitate
some judicial review and legislative and public scrutiny of prosecutorial discretion. Davis also aug-
gests a variation on the Administrative Procedure Act's rule-making procedure, including public
comment and staff review. Id. at 65. See generally Friedman, Some Jurisprudential Considerations
in Developing an Administrative Law for the Criminal Pre-Trial Process, 51 J. URBAN L. 433 (1974)
(emphasizing the need for administrative law to promote equality and fairness in prosecutorial dis-
cretion in the criminal pre-trial process).
94. Cf. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.11 (1982) ("A charging decision does not
levy an improper 'penalty' unless it results directly from the defendant's exercise of a protected legal
right, rather than the prosecutor's normal assessment of the societal interest in prosecution.");
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)
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cially enforced standards or constraints on the executive decision of
whether to prosecute.95
Yet under our system of government all persons should be able to
obtain recourse from the judiciary in safeguarding basic values of equal
treatment by the government and fair and impartial criminal process.
This is especially so when the claim is that minorities are being oppressed
by majorities and their representatives.96 In these cases the courts may
be the last institution between democracy and the tyranny of fixed major-
ity factions. 97 The hope, often unfulfilled, is that the courts, and espe-
cially the federal courts,98 will constitutionally deflect majority passions
from isolating and unfairly persecuting individual members of powerless
groups. The courts might even exercise moral leadership in reminding
this nation of its higher aspirations.99 Unfortunately, as current constitu-
tional doctrine reflects, the closing days of the twentieth century are
much like the closing days of the nineteenth century with courts again
pretending that the racially disparate impact of law does not warrant
judicial action.l"o Demographics, pluralistic ignorance, and ideology im-
pair the ability of American courts to hear the voices of women and mi-
norities and to fairly adjudicate their claims. 1 '
(selectivity in enforcement is constitutional provided that it is not based upon "an unjustifiable stan-
dard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.")).
95. Typically the decision whether to prosecute is unfettered prior to indictment. See, eg., K.C.
DAvIs, supra note 34, at 189 (raising the question: "Why should the vital decisions [the prosecutor]
makes be immune to review by other officials and immune to review by the courts, even though our
legal and governmental system elsewhere generally assumes the need for checking human frail-
ties?"); Frase, supra note 75, at 303 (arguing that prosecutorial discretion is broad and "unchecked
by any formal, external contraints or regulatory mechanisms"); Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1523-
25.
96. This is the specter raised by the evolving pattern of targeting poor minority women of color.
See supra notes 21, 28. As discussed in Part III below, this emerging pattern is consistent with
pernicious traditions in America of dominating and controlling women and minorities, but especially
women of color.
97. . ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTusT 152-54 (1980) (arguing that the courts have a unique
and legitimate role in disallowing race-based fixed factions from distorting pluralistic political
process).
98. Although often undeserved, the federal courts occupy a unique position in the minds of
oppressed racial groups and others, and in the strategies of the lawyers committed to their liberation
struggles. See, eg., 1 R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 65 (1975) (stating that the Supreme Court is
considered to be by many the "esteemed broker of national disputes").
99. M. PERRY, MoRALrry, POLITICS, & LAW 134-36 (1988).
100. See Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
101. Demographics are crucial. Minority representation on the courts of America is important
for several reasons. The visibility of minorities in the judiciary is important symbolically as a token
of fairness and equality in America. However, tokenism addresses only appearances and justice
requires authentic minority representation for the substantive positions and sensitivities that minori-
ties can bring to the bench. See Welch, Combs & Gruhl, Do Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32
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The demographics of the federal judiciary are illustrative of both
federal and state judiciaries"0 2 and have a special significance given the
federal judiciary's unique historical role as the perceived centurion of
constitutional justice. 103  The demographics of the federal courts, how-
ever, do not bode well for their continued occupancy of that role. 10 4 The
Nixon, Ford, Reagan and Bush federal courts are "insiders"' courts,105
AM. J. POL. Sci. 126 (1988). See generally Guinier, supra note 7, at 133, 1103 (suggesting electoral
reform proposals which would better address the political reality of black voters). For example,
pluralistic ignorance cannot be altered by mere tokenism. A substantial number of minority judges is
necessary to assure receptive, fair and open judicial forums. The proportionality of minority repre-
sentation is also a useful prima facie test for whether the American system is working as it should.
Unless there is some very good explanation as to why not, America's governmental institutions
should include roughly the same percentage of each group as that group occupies in the general
population.
102. This is illustrative because state courts do not have better demographic representation than
do federal courts. See, eg., Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2359 (1991) (noting there has never
been an African-American elected to the Louisiana Supreme Court); HLA v. Attorney General of
Texas, 111 S. Ct. 2376, 2379 (1991) (noting that only 5% of the district judges in Harris County,
Texas were African-American despite the fact that the population was 20% percent African-Ameri-
can). While 41 states have some African-American representation on their courts, only 36 have
representation on major courts. Graham, Judicial Recruitment and Racial Diversity on State Courts,
74 JUDICATURE 28, 30 (1990). The percentage on courts of general and appellate jurisdiction is
small enough to amount to tokenism. African-American judges constitute approximately 3.8% of
all state court judges, but are disproportionately concentrated in part-time and limited jurisdiction
courts. Id at 32. The percentage of African-Americans on the bench roughly mirrors the percentage
of lawyers in the country who are African-Americans, approximately 3%. Id. However, this paltry
number is inadequate to substantively influence state court decision-making and overcome judicial
pluralistic ignorance. Moreover, since minority lawyers generally make less money than their white
counterparts, judgeships are relatively more attractive. Thus for economic reasons one would expect
a high proportion of minority lawyers would want to be judges. However, there are other barriers at
work. See generally Cook, Black Representation in the Third Branch, 1 BLACK L.J. 264 (1972)
(discussing the underrepresentation of African-Americans on the bench).
103. The federal courts have traditionally been looked to as the backbone of federal constitu-
tional justice. See, eg., J. ELY, supra note 97, at 83 (discussing the Supreme Court's role in the
protection of the politically powerless); 1 R. KLUGER, supra note 98, at 65-66.
104. Right from the outset it should be made clear that group characteristics of the judiciary do
not preclude individual judges from stepping away from their groups and listening to outsider voices.
For example, just because a judge can be grouped demographically with other white males who are
apparently heterosexual and relatively affluent does not necessarily mean that a judge will act like
them. A few extraordinary people do successfully manage to get beyond these limitations. But the
myth of the self-created and self-determining individual is often carried too far. The group defini-
tions society imposes on people, the group characteristics we use in defining ourselves, and how these
groupings define the contours of our lives is often understated. Who one is in life and the choices
one has are for the most part circumscribed by factors beyond an individual's control. These typi-
cally include the family into which one is born, gender, race and socio-economic class. And if you
do not believe that groups matter sometimes much more than individual traits, take the following
test suggested by Professor Linda Green: If you could, would you take a pill and be reincarnated as
a poor black girl in America? If your honest answer is no, then reflect on the meaning of America's
judges being overwhelmingly affluent white males.
105. The antonymic terms "insider" and "outsider" are sociological terms Justice O'Connor has
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not representative of America as a whole.' 6 The federal judiciary is
demographically way out of balance; it is much wealthier,1 7 racially
whiter and more disproportionately male than any American govern-
mental institution should be.
For federal circuit court appointments, no minority women need ap-
ply. Federal circuit court appointments are Presidential and generally
without the traditional deferential courtesy extended to United States
Senators at the district court level.' 08 They are thus a good indicator of
the kind of judiciary a president desires. Of the approximately 150 ap-
pointments made to the United States Circuit Courts by Nixon, Ford,
used, particularly in troubling cases involving marginalized minority religious rights. Eg., Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
106. While the dissent in Chisom was wrong as a matter of statutory construction on whether
Congress intended judges to be included within the term representative for the purposes of the Vot-
ing Rights Act, Chisom v. Roemer, Ill S.Ct. 2354, 2366 (1991) (noting that Congress intended
"representative" to mean "someone who has prevailed in a popular election"), the dissent makes a
quite sound general point. Judges are not or should not be representatives in the same sense that
legislators are representatives. Id. at 2373 (Scala J., dissenting). Yet judges should be representa-
tives in another sense. Judges must both appear to be impartial and fair, and in fact be impartial and
fair, see C. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 37-42, 57-63 (1960) (suggesting that the
Court's role in government is to legitimize governmental action in part by appearing to be an impar-
tial tribunal willing and able to constrain government). In order to be impartial and fair, the judici-
ary as a group must be able to apprehend the arguments and the voices of those asserting claims. By
virtue of its present demographics, pluralistic ignorance, and ideology, the courts are not able to
fulfill their proper representational roles.
The appearance of impartiality may be compromised by the large number of judges who were
prosecutors during their formative years. Out of 135 Reagan, Ford and Nixon appointments to the
federal circuit courts, 46 (34%) had former prosecutorial experience. See Goldman, Reagan's Judi-
cial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318, 324-25 (1989). Cf J.
EIsEN STEN, supra note 57, at 48 (stating that being a United States Attorney is a stepping stone to
the federal judiciary).
107. Over half of the people appointed to the circuit courts by Reagan had net worths in excess
of one-half million dollars. See Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy, supra note 106, at 324 (report-
ing that 32.1% had a net worth between $200,000 and $499,000, 33.3% had a net worth between
$500,000 and $999,999, and 17.9% had a net worth over one million dollars) [hereinafter Reagan's
Judicial Legacy]. To appreciate how extraordinary such net worths are in America, consider that
according to the Census Bureau, as of 1988 the median net worth of white households was $43,279
and of Black households only $4,169. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORT,
HOUSEHOLD WEALTH AND AssETr OwNERsmP (Household Economic Studies, Series P-70, No.
22) (1990). Thus, over half of Reagan's circuit court appointees had a net worth in excess of 11
times the median white American household and over 120 times the net worth of the median black
American householdl Given the order of magnitude of these economic differences, it is not surpris-
ing that this comparatively wealthy group of judges is not in touch with the economic exigencies of
the choices faced by poor minority women. Even white males of modest financial means have found
it necessary to resign from the federal bench. See McAllister, The Judiciary's 'Quiet Crisis Prestige
Doesn't Pay the Tuition, Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1987, at A19, col. 1.
108. Goldman, Reaganizing the Judiciary: The First Term Appointments, 68 JUDICATURE 313,
315 (1985).
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Reagan and Bush, approximately 97% were white, 93% were white
males, 4% were white women and 3% were minority males.109 This au-
thor's research reveals no, zero, minority women were appointed by these
four Presidents to any United States Circuit Court. Given the ideologies
of the Mitchell/Smith/Meese/Thornburgh Departments of Justice, and
the class, complexion and predominant gender of the federal judiciary
appointed by the Republicans over nineteen of the last twenty-three
years, the federal judiciary would not appear to be well-positioned to
hear the claims of minority women. 110
As a group, these judges are so underrepresentative of some groups
in America that they are not equipped to fairly adjudicate the claims of
these outsiders. 1 1 Issues of race, gender and class intersect in ways that
these judges as a group are not experientially equipped to comprehend. 112
These judges are probably just as afflicted as are other white Americans
by beliefs in insidious racial and ethnic stereotypes about African-Ameri-
cans and Hispanics.1" 3 Many whites still believe stereotypes such as the
109. See Reagan's Judicial Legacy, supra note 107, at 325 (1989).
110. This is nothing new in America. Throughout American history the federal judiciary has
been demographically overrepresentative of affluent white males, and during most periods in history
this judiciary has willingly served as the instrument of white male control over minorities, women
and the poor. Sadly, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) and McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) are much more typical of
the American Supreme Court than is Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) or Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
111. Not included in the above statistics is President Carter's impressive record for appointing
minorities and women to the federal courts. Of Carter's 56 appointment to the Courts of Appeals,
16.1% were African-American, 3.6% Hispanic, 1.8% Asian, and 19.6% were women. Goldman,
Carter's JudicialAppointment" A Lasting Legacy, 64 JUDICATURE 344, 350 (1981). These aged and
aging judges have a dwindling but still beneficial impact on the appearance and substantive quality of
justice in America.
112. Many federal judges do not recognize how their own prejudices and privileged life exper-
iences impact the ways in which they view the behavior of those who appear in front of them. This
proposition is true even if one ignores the astounding insensitivity of at least one man the Bush
administration nominated to the 11th Circuit Federal Court. Lewis, Heeding the Grass Roots In
Judicial Nominations, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1991, at 6, col. I (reporting on the first defeat of a Bush
judicial nominee, District Judge Kenneth L. Ryskamp, who had repudiated neither his membership
in a reputedly all white club which excluded Jews nor his comments endorsing African-American
suspects being mauled by police dogs).
113. How many federal judges see a black man in a BMW and think to themselves that he is
probably a drug dealer? Most federal judges have no experiential basis on which to contradict
American racial stereotyping, and their view from the bench in this age of drug war mania does
nothing but reinforce the worst portrayals of America's minorities. See generally Bodenhauser &
Wyer, Effects of Stereotypes on Decision-Making and Information-Processing Strategies, 48 J. PEas.
& SoC. PSYCHOLOGY 267, 268 (1985) (demonstrating how stereotypes can contribute to greater
punishments for members of stigmatized groups when the behavior punished is apprehended as con-
sistent with the stereotype).
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alleged desire of Blacks and Hispanics to be on welfare, their inability to
be caring parents, and their angry or hostile nature.114 Racially and class
segregated housing, schools, churches and clubs are the norm in America
and the judiciary, given its demographics, is likely to be more sheltered
from real integration than the average American. The white men on the
American judiciary have little to no experience with minorities who are
not in a servile relationship. In short, the federal judiciary looks and
with but rare exceptions acts much like Justice Kennedy's former all
male, mostly white club. 5 These narrow demographics create an envi-
ronment ripe for pluralistic ignorance to breed and fester.
The likelihood that the judiciary is misapprehending the claims be-
ing presented to it is increased under conditions where pluralistic igno-
rance can go unchallenged. Pluralistic ignorance refers to the false social
knowledge shared by one group regarding one or more other groups. 1 6
For example, when nontrivial discrepancies emerge between beliefs
shared among judges about what other groups are doing and thinking
and what those other groups are in fact doing and thinking, pluralistic
ignorance exists. It refers to patterns of intergroup false beliefs and usu-
ally occurs unnoticed and unintended, but nevertheless acts as an influen-
tial and often decisive component in defining social actions. 1 7 Pluralistic
ignorance is a particularly insidious form of inaccurate intergroup igno-
rance because there is not only incorrect knowledge, but it is shared and
believed to be shared with others in the group. This has the effect of
increasing the ingroup's confidence in the incorrect information and en-
hances the likelihood that the error will go unrecognized. Pluralistic ig-
norance is shared self-reinforcing group bias, without doubt."'
As applied to the American judiciary, pluralistic ignorance can be
defined as a group of privileged, mostly affluent white males talking
amongst themselves about what are the reasonable choices for poor peo-
ple of color to be making in situations virtually none of the judges have
ever been in. Pluralistic ignorance affects the courts' methodology and
the doctrine they espouse. The current white male Republican federal
courts apparently are content to use a legal methodology consistent with
114. T. Smith, supra note 89, at 5.
115. See, eg., Lewis, Judicial Nominee May Be Imperiled, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1991, at A14,
col. 1 (discussing a Federal Appeals Court nominee's membership in a country club which allegedly
excluded African-Americans and Jews).
116. See O'GORMAN, supra note 4.
117. Id.
118. Id
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the world views of those who put them in their life-tenured positions." 9
These courts only reflect the views of those that elected their Presi-
dents. 2 ° For example, both Scalia's and Kennedy's appointments could
cynically be viewed as reflecting not just "the merits" of these two men,
but as providing representation for white ethnic American males who
feel under siege and who are the backbone of the new Republican Presi-
dential majority.' 2 ' These Republican judges were not appointed to and
do not appear to be providing justice to those traditionally excluded from
the American Dream: the poor, African-Americans, Native Americans,
Latinos, Asian-Americans, women and others. 22 To some of these
119. The theory or method of constitutional interpretation in which these judges believe is gen-
erally consistent with that of the legal methods/ideologies of the administrations that appointed
them. The effect of adopting these methodologies is not truth and justice but rather to preserve
original American privilege of the "reasonable white Protestant man" against those of different race,
gender, and class, by appointing judges that sincerely but wrongly believe that the insider's view
carries with it the moral force of right. Cf Marshall, Commentary: Reflections on the Bicentennial of
the United States Constitution, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1987) (explaining that the Constitution was
very much a "product of its times" and intended to convey the racist ideologies of some of its
framers).
Virtually all of Reagan's appointees (97.4%) were Republicans. Reagan's Judicial Legacy, supra
note 107, at 324-25. That these Republican appointees were confirmed with remarkably little oppo-
sition even during periods when the Democrats were in control of the Senate is more a testament to
the comfortable accommodation provided by the Democrats to the reigning Republicans, than it is
to the candidates' neutrality or commitment to social justice and equality. K. PHILLIPS, THE POLI-
TICS OF RICH AND POOR 47 (1990); L. TRIBE, GOD SAvE THIS HONORABLE COURT 93 (1985). The
Senate's rejection of the controversial Bork nomination is one of the exceptions to the rule that the
Senate is comfortable confirming an overwhelmingly afiluent white male judiciary. Only in the most
egregious cases will the Senate seriously consider not confirming a nominee. See, eg., Lewis, supra
note 115. With a few notable exceptions, most United States Senators are just insiders of a slightly
different stripe; they do not represent the "underclass" in America and frequently accommodate
their Republican privileged counterparts like George Herbert Walker Bush or J. Danforth Quayle.
120. Note, All The President's Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the US.
Courts of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 766, 770-72 (1987) (comparing the Reagan-appointed circuit
judges and those of other Republicans with those of Democrats and finding that Republican appoin-
tees were more "conservative" in cases where discrimination had been claimed, and were more hos-
tile to the claims of criminal defendants). From down under, case by case adjudications may be just
a myth diverting attention from the extent to which federal judges see the world and act as products
of their biased backgrounds, not unlike most people. The totality of the circumstances and other
similarly vague rubrics may merely camouflage judicial bias not even fully realized by the judges
who are pluralistically ignorant.
121. Some views that Justices Kennedy and Scalia have brought to the table of justice would
serve caucasian males better than poor minority women. See, eg., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
110 S. Ct. 2997, 3045 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting with Scalia) (setting forth concerns from the
"perceptions" of those "minorities" that did not make the government's minority list). Cf Scalia,
The Disease as Cure, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 147, 152 (discussing his view that the "debt" of Italians,
Jews, Irish, and Poles who took no part in slave-based oppression, is comparatively a "molehill").
122. This is not to suggest that most judges are not sincere people of great integrity who are
deciding constitutional questions as they really see them. Rather, the suggestion is that this judici-
ary, as a group, tends to see America in ways which are largely consistent with who they are -
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judges the problem of race in America is just somebody else's history.'23
These men interpret the Constitution in pursuit of the dream that advan-
tages them: a publicly non-ethnic, colorless America where the uninter-
rupted legacy of slavery and hegemony of color is simply ignored.'24
What little direct data there is, collected by a currently sitting cir-
cuit court judge, suggests that where the defendants are black, the judges
which identify themselves as having a judicial philosophy or viewpoint in
tune with the Rehnquist Court are much more likely to see the world like
white police officers than like blacks who admittedly have been victim-
ized by a white mob.12  The federal courts are-and are likely to be for
years-literally white men's courts with no apparent effort to reach out
to other perspectives. 126 The consequence of this is that the federal judi-
consummate affluent white male insiders. Cf. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of
Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 792 (1970) (opining that "[o]nly a few appellate
judges can throw off the fetters of their middle-class backgrounds... and identify with the criminal
suspect instead of with the policeman .... ").
Nor is it to suggest that judges are entirely predictable. Earl Warren may illustrate that who
someone has been before he is appointed to the Court is no guarantee of what positions he will take
on particular issues. And certainly Justice Blackmun has been a wonderful justice although ap-
pointed by a President who resigned in the disgrace of Watergate. How likely are such surprises
from Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy or even Souter? As Professor Tribe persuasively argues,
generally when Presidents have tried to pick Justices and inferior Article III federal judges because
of their views on one or more issues, these Presidents have been generally successful at getting what
they wanted. L. TRIE, supra note 119, at 60.
123. Eg., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3028-29 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
124. See Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1060 (1991).
125. Bright, Do Philosophy and Oral Argument Influence Decisions? Getting There, A.B.A. J.,
Mar. 1991, at 68, 71. By contrast, judges identifying with the Warren and Burger Courts could hear
and potentially credit the voices of outsider victims. Judge Bright's study is consistent with the real
life incident at Howard Beach, where a black victim of a white mob's racial attack was initially
treated with the presumption of black criminality by law enforcement officers. C. HYNEs, INCIDENT
AT HOWARD BEACH: THE CASE FOR MURDER 32-38 (1990). See generally Bodenhauser & Wyer,
supra note 113, at 268 (where experimental data suggested that preconceived, sterotype-based im-
pressions color the meaning ascribed to acts of indeterminate meaning).
126. And for those disinclined to believe that demographics make a difference in the content,
tone and quality of judicial justice, just imagine the difference in deliberations on an appellate panel
over issues revolving around race and gender if women and minority judges were on each of these
panels and heard. Exercises of prosecutorial discretion would be more closely scrutinized, and the
situated "choices" of poor minority women better understood. Unfortunately, many appellate court
panels after four Republican Administrations have used the white male model for court appointees
which reflects the exclusion of outsider views. In addition, the federal criminal bar practicing before
the judiciary is also virtually an all white club. Thus the courts do not even have translators to help
educate them from in front of the bench. Cf. Torres & Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent
and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE 1. 625, 647 (arguing that legal story-telling
in the courts often evades the questions of power, perspective and domination)[hereinafter Translat-
ing Yonnondio]; Torres, Local Knowledge Local Color: Critical Legal Studies and The Law of Race
Relations, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1043, 1051 (1988).
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ciary does not appear to be a receptive forum for poor minority women
defendants. Like most outsiders, these women should not look to the
federal courts as likely sources of their salvation. 127
Such courts are ill-equipped to understand the nature of choice for
the women and minorities that come before them. The cases in connec-
tion with the meaning of choice for poor and minority women in regard
to abortions are illustrative. 121 It is simply hard for these courts to com-
prehend what it is like to be a poor woman trying to "choose" whether to
abort a pregnancy when the woman may not be able to afford the preg-
nancy or the abortion. To appreciate the role of pluralistic ignorance in
judicial misapprehension of these questions, imagine for a moment the
nature of the deliberations, as a privileged affluent group of white men
turn to each other to discuss, develop and verify the opinions in these
cases.
Similarly, in the context of the war on drugs and especially as it is
waged against minorities, the court has repeatedly misapprehended the
nature of choice. The Bostick case decided in June of 1991 is ilustra-
tive.129 In Bostick, the Court held that armed drug enforcement agents
may approach a man seated in the back of an interstate bus without rea-
sonable suspicion sufficient to justify a fourth amendment seizure, ques-
tion the man and request to search his luggage so long as the police do
not convey a message that compliance is required. 130  Justice Marshall
for himself and two other justices proffered a vigorous and sound dissent,
concluding that when officers conduct dragnet sweeps where passengers
must either cooperate or exit their bus and possibly be stranded, that this
"choice" is no "choice" at all. 31
127. See, eg., D. BELL, supra note 7, at 48. For a variety of reasons state court may not be
subject to this same sense of futility for outsider causes. Cf Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the
Stater The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535,
550-51 (1986) (explaining that state courts have begun to take their obligations seriously as protec-
tors of civil rights and liberties).
128. See, eg, Rust v. Sullivan, Il1 S. Ct. 1759, 1778 (1991) (holding that Title X program
funding restrictions did not affect indigent women's right to choose an abortion); Id. at 1784-86
(dissenting as to the impact on a woman's freedom of choice Title X restrictions on medical advise
have under government funded program); L. TRIBE, supra note 32, at 15-16 (surveying earlier perti-
nent case law).
129. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2383 (1991).
130. For the Bostick majority, that the man was confined was the result of his decision to take
the bus, not police action. The appropriate constitutional inquiry is whether a reasonable person
would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. Id. at 2386 - 88.
131. Id. at 2394. Justice Marshall's dissent points out that our nation is told it is engaged in a
"war on drugs" and that law enforcement's job is to devise effective weapons, "[b]ut the effective-
ness of a law-enforcement technique is not proof of its constitutionality." Id. at 2389. While sweeps
are occasionally fruitful, they "are inconvenient, intrusive, and intimidating." Id. at 2390. This is
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As Professor Maclin demonstrated in connection with earlier cases,
the Court's fourth amendment reasonable person standard is unrealistic.
Under the circumstances in many recent cases, no real and innocent rea-
sonable person would in fact feel free to decline police requests. 132 But of
more direct significance in respect to the Court's inability to apprehend
the voices of minorities, nowhere did the Court even mention the most
salient fact in deciding whether an innocent reasonable person in Bos-
tick's situation would have felt coerced. Bostick is an African-American.
In America, "[riace matters,"'13 3 and Bostick's being an African-
American is relevant in at least two respects. First, although sophisti-
cated police would never admit it, the fact that Bostick was an African-
American male was a substantial factor in his being targeted for investi-
gation, since "[r]ace is among the first things that one notices about an-
other individual."' 34 This would be hard to prove under current
standards virtually requiring the police to admit race based discrimina-
tion in open court.1 35 But the fact that unspoken racism is hard to prove
does not mean it was not a significant factor.
1 36
Second, the Court was like Alice in Wonderland on the issue of Bos-
tick's consent to search. 37 Bostick, as an African-American male, would
not have felt free to refuse the entreaties of two armed white police of-
especially true in the context of buses. Sweeps are particularly repugnant to American ideals insofar
as they require Americans to show their papers to pass through the public way. Bostick's consent
was unconstitutionally obtained because he was unadvised of his rights, had no reason to know a
refusal to cooperate could not be held against him, and was subjected to the intimidating effect of
being partially blocked in the back of a bus and questioned by an armed officer.
132. Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75
CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1303 (1990).
133. See Aleinikoff, supra note 124, at 1066.
134. Id. at 1066.
135. While a defendant might be entitled in discretionary administrative cases to an inference of
discriminatory intent, this is true only if the defendant could prove disparate impact. See eg., Bat-
son v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84-99 (1986) (holding that racially disparate use of peremptory chal-
lenge and other circumstances can give rise to an inference of unconstitutional prosecutorial
practice). Generally, it is difficult for the defendant to prove that minorities are being disproportion-
ately targeted for investigation because of their race, because the agency best positioned to collect
and maintain such data is the law enforcement unit against which this information would be used.
Indeed, in this author's experience and that of others with whom he has spoken, when counsel even
tries to raise this line of questioning with police officials, judges frown, allow police officers to feign
ignorance, and attempt to severely limit this line of inquiry, even during non-jury pretrial
proceedings.
136. See Lawrence, supra note 78, at 322.
137. Make-believe images of the flawlessness of police departments is common. See, eg.,
Rohter, Police Beating Unsettles World of Make-Believe, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1991, at A14, col. 1
(discussing how the videotaped beating of Rodney King shattered the fictionalized image of the Los
Angeles police created by television).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ficers in the back of a bus in the South. Given the continuing history of
violence by law enforcement officers against American black males,138
only a court of privileged whites could convince itself that in the intimi-
dating situation created by the police, an innocent African-American,
would have felt he had the "choice" to refuse these white police
officers. 1
3 9
In real America, as opposed to the pretend colorless fairylands the
courts create for themselves, one of the circumstances surrounding any
determination of free choice in an interaction with the police is the tar-
get's race. 14° Yet as with poor women and abortion, imagine judges in
conference on the typical drug case involving minority males: probably
an all white mostly affluent group of men with power deciding what a
reasonable African-American man would conclude about his power to
consent in a tight interaction with two Southern white police officers.
The demographics of the courts make the risk that decisions will be pred-
icated on pluralistic ignorance substantial.14 1  Neither Bostick nor the
courts' decisions on the abortion rights of poor women offer any real
judicial constraint on executive exercises of power which may oppress
minorities or women. Similar unreality runs throughout the current doc-
trines which are supposed to constrain prosecutors.
The two primary methods for challenging prosecutorial discretion in
the courts are civil lawsuits and raising selective prosecution as a defense
138. This history began with the returning runaway slaves, was continued through police com-
plicity with the Ku Klux Klan, and lives today in the savage beatings of Michael Stewart, Federico
Pereira and Rodney King. In light of this history, a reasonable minority male simply would not, in
the words of Justice Blackmun, feel "at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his busi-
ness." Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988). See, eg., McKinley, Police Cleared Of-
ficers on Their Word, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1991, at B6, col. 4 (discussing a suspicious police
investigation which exonerated five police officers of all charges in connection with the choking
death of Federico Pereira).
139. A feminist analogy may be elucidating. An encounter such as that in Bostick is like a
woman's situation when confronted with the physical but unarticulated threat of rape by a man who
verbally gives the woman a choice. Like a woman about to be raped, Bostick may have verbally been
given a choice he didn't really have.
140. Aleinikoff, supra note 124, at 1069-71 (describing continuing power of race as a defining
and controlling group classification).
141. Moreover, this circle of judicial ignorance is not often broken by the inclusion of minority
judicial law clerks within the staffs of significant numbers of judges. (Here, given the typical interac-
tion among law clerks for various judges, particularly at the appellate level, a few minority law clerks
might go a long way). The hiring record of most judges is atrocious and the judges' excuses for their
own employment patterns are weak. See, eg., Sturgess, Five Judges Won't Report on Clerks' Race,
Gender Affirmative-Action Rebellion in D.C Circuit, Legal Times, August 5, 1991, at 1. Nor is the
circle broken through educative "translating" function of counsel, see Torres & Milun, Translating
Yonnondio, supra note 126, for the number of minority counsel in America's courts, especially fed-
eral criminal court, remains paltry.
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in a criminal case. Civil lawsuits have been rendered all but useless by
contemporary case or controversy requirements evolved by the Burger/
Rehnquist court,142 as well as by official immunity doctrines. 43 Institut-
ing civil rights suits against prosecutors for deprivation of fundamental
rights during the charging phase of a criminal case 144 is also conceiva-
ble.1 45 This is not, however, a very promising means of invoking judicial
control and review of exercises of prosecutorial discretion given the limi-
tation on damage actions,146 and the case or controversy requirements
evolved by the Burger/Rehnquist courts. 47
Raising the question of selective prosecution as a defense in a crimi-
nal case has greater theoretical promise; 48 but this too has been rendered
142. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372-73 (1976) (holding that even those previously mis-
treated by the police did not have the requisite "personal stake" in overhauling an allegedly racist
police department to satisfy a present case or controversy requirement); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 498 (1974) (holding that the lack of other imminent prosecutions against respondents
defeated lawsuit alleging racially discriminatory administration of criminal justice system because
case-or-controversy requirement is not met).
143. In the federal system this might be attempted under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83, 1985 (1970), as
well as directly under the Constitution. See also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1974)
(involving suit based on alleged deprivation of rights secured by the aforementioned sections of Title
42 of the U.S. Code). An aspect of this issue was recently decided by the United States Supreme
Court. In the case of Burns v. Reed, the Supreme Court held that a state prosecuting attorney is
absolutely immune for damages under § 1983 for participating in a probable cause hearing, but not
for giving legal advice to the police. 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991).
144. For the purposes of this article there is little need to consider exercises of prosecutorial
discretion beyond the charging phases. While the treatment of drug-addicted mothers is also impor-
tant at these other stages, the basic decision whether to prosecute raises all of this author's concerns
with the mostly unlimited breadth of prosecutorial discretion and amply illustrates the need for
reform.
145. In initiating such lawsuits, however, litigants must be mindful of potential Rule 11 sanc-
tions for using repetitive or novel theories in hostile courts. See Blue v. United States Dep't of the
Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.
1988).
146. Injunctive relief theoretically could be sought to prevent such rights deprivations. See
Smith v. Meese, 821 F.2d 1484, 1488 (l1th Cir. 1987) (holding that black voters had standing to
challenge investigatory and prosecutorial policies as effectively depriving voters of constitutional
rights to vote and to associate freely). Contra Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (finding in part
that individuals and organizations did not satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement in alleging
patterns of police brutality). However, money damages could not be sought, at least under § 1983,
given the immunity protections accorded to prosecutors. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431
(1976).
147. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); see Developments-Race and the Prosecutor's Charging
Decision, supra note 43, at 1532-35.
148. One equal protection argument might be that since courts are forbidden by the separation
of powers doctrine from ordering prosecutors to act affirmatively and prosecute affluent white wo-
men who prenatally risk harm to their unborn by ingesting alcohol, cocaine or other chemicals,
courts could prohibit prosecutors from initiating similar prosecutions against poor, minority, drug-
addicted women.
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anemic by judicially imposed proof requirements. 149 In actual criminal
cases, the defendant usually argues that the government has violated
Equal Protection under either the fourteenth or fifth amendments in se-
lecting him or her for prosecution. Like many civil rights lawsuits, the
selective prosecution doctrine is impotent under present case law.150
Selective prosecution doctrine is presently controlled by Wayte v.
United States.' In Wayte, the Court held that opponents of the selec-
tive service draft could be targeted for prosecution for their refusal to
register, not withstanding their assertion of first amendment interests.
15 2
Relying on the stringent discriminatory purpose requirement adopted in
Washington v. Davis,'"3 the Court concluded in Wayte that even where
there is a disparate impact on a group with protected constitutional inter-
ests, facially neutral governmental action must be proven to have been
intended to compromise a constitutionally protected interest. Statistical
disparity by itself does not give rise to an inference of bad motive; direct
proof of discriminatory purpose must be shown.'-
4
Courts have applied these onerous selective prosecution standards in
the context of race-based claims.' 5  Although there have been vigorous
and persuasive dissents from this approach,'5 6 and even though the er-
rant majority Justices might eventually mend their ways, the judicial he-
gemony of the Nixon, Reagan, and Bush courts appears committed to
forcing outsider litigants to meet impossible and irrelevant burdens,1
5 7
and perhaps to just abandon the courthouse altogether. In light of these
and other recent holdings of the Rehnquist Court,5 8 the demographics
of the judiciary and the legal methodology of these courts, it does not
149. See, e.g., Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1539-42, 1556.
150. For example, problems of proof are considerable. See Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1539-
42, 1556. A major caveat must be added: greater protection than is available under federal Constitu-
tional standards can often be afforded under individual state constitutional provisions by state
courts. This part of this article is not intended to discourage such efforts. Rather, the primary point
here is that given the current doctrine and demographics of the appellate federal courts, they are not
likely saviors.
151. 470 U.S. 598, 608-10 (1985).
152. Id. at 608-10.
153. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
154. 470 U.S. 598, 608-10 (1985).
155. Developments-Race and the Prosecutor's Charging Decision, supra note 43, at 1542-44.
156. Id. at 1545-49.
157. Cf Jones, Unrightable Wrongs: The Rehnquist Court, Civil Rights, and an Elegy for
Dreams, 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 1 (1990) (arguing that the Rehnquist court's interpretative method and
its usage of the "fault model" have produced barriers for civil rights litigants).
158. See R. BRooKs, supra note **, at 1 (suggesting that the Supreme Court's 1989 massacre of
civil rights laws reflect an insensitive court majority that believes America does not currently have a
social problem based on racism).
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appear that the courts are forums to which poor minority women should
look for relief from abuses of prosecutorial discretion, nor are these likely
to in fact be fair.
Examining the complex, often resonating and elusive concept of
choice'1 9 as applied to drug-addicted pregnant minority women illus-
trates the point. Poor African-American drug-addicted women do not
have much by the way of choice in their lives.1" The American dream
defines the American judiciary's experiential reality, by virtue of their
race, inherited privilege, hard work, and availed opportunity; those serv-
ing on United States courts have had choices not available to poor black
women from Mississippi like Ms. Hardy. Little in these judges' back-
grounds, or their life experiences, prepares them to sit in judgment of
those whose lives have been the antithesis of their own.1 61
159. See L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 184-223 (1987).
160. Often these women are viewed as criminally responsible because it is argued that they
"choose" to be pregnant and further "choose" to be addicted. The view expressed by the judge in a
Florida case is typical:
The fact that the defendant was addicted to cocaine at the time of these offenses is not a
defense. The choice to use or not use cocaine is just that - a choice. Once the defend-
ant made that choice she assumed responsibility for the natural consequences of it. The
defendant also made a choice to become pregnant and to allow those pregnancies to
come to term. Upon making those choices the defendant assumed the responsibility to
deliver children who were not being delivered cocaine or a derivative of it into their
bodies. Children, like all persons, have the right to be free from having cocaine intro-
duced into their systems by others.
People v. Johnson, No. E89-890-CFT, slip op. (Fla. 18th Dist. Ct. July 13, 1989), affid No. 89-1765,
slip op. (Fla. Fifth Dist. Ct. App. April 18, 1991), appeal docketed.
For an examination of the role of choice in the situation of drug-addicted people, see Schmoke,
An Argument in Favor of Decriminalization, 18 HovsTrA L. RPv. 501, 511 (1990). The effects of
drugs in the lives and choices confronting drug-addicted pregnant women is an exceedingly complex
subject. See Roberts, supra note 2, at 1445.
161. This is an acute problem because while pluralistic ignorance and race and gender-based
prejudice are educable diseases, from whom will these men learn, each other? This is the quintes-
sence of "pluralistic ignorance, shared group prejudices and stereotypes, confirmed and reinforced
through verification with others similarly afflicted. See O'GoRmAN, supra note 4.
Ordinarily the education of judges is the function of counsel in front of the bench, both through
briefs and oral arguments. Behind the bench, judges are tutored by their law clerks and other judges.
But given the demographics of the federal judiciary, the federal bar and the pool of judicial law
clerks, (almost all of whom are white, affluent and male), who is there to break these circles of
mutually reinforced ignorance, stereotypes and prejudice? None of the perspectives of the women
being prosecuted are easily accessible for these judges. In a different context, Professor Torres has
discussed a similar phenomenon in connection with the translation of Native American world views
before American courts. Torres & Milun, Translating Yonnondio, supra note 126. The contempo-
rary federal judiciary is bereft of the outsider translating function; it cannot hear the outsider voice,
and thus is not legitimate for all segments of America.
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ii. Legislative Constraint. In theory, the legislature could exercise
considerable control over prosecutorial discretion. First, the legislature
could periodically prune criminal statutes, eliminating crimes for which
there was no longer a public consensus. When rarely enforced laws are
on the books they invite pernicious selection of defendants and
prosecutorial abuse. 162 Second, greater precision in statutory drafting
could limit prosecutorial discretion. Third, the legislature could impose
procedural limitations on how the prosecutorial function is executed by
requiring written guidelines. 163 Finally, the legislature could limit prose-
cutors by controlling the funds available for different kinds of prosecu-
tions and within constitutional limitations, through committee and staff
oversight and control of the purse strings. 1 4
Yet notwithstanding the theoretical potential for legislative control,
actual control is not particularly effective. This is so for several reasons.
It is politically easier to make something a crime than to decriminalize
behavior. 16  For example, while there are almost no prosecutions for
adultery, politicians apparently sense that generally it is not politically
feasible to decriminalize adultery.1 66 Perhaps the difficulty is that while
the behavior would not be criminalized if the legislature was starting on a
blank sheet, when something is already criminal, legislators fear if they
suggest decriminalizing the behavior the public might mistakenly believe
the legislators are endorsing the behavior. Another reason for over-
162. Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1531. See also Johnson, supra note 53 (reporting adultery
prosecutions at spousal behest).
163. Illustrative of legislative restriction would be New York statutes which limit discretion in
prosecutorial post-indictment pleas. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.10 (McKinney 1982). Signifi-
cantly, these statutes do not mandate specific charges be brought even where there is sufficient drug
weight to warrant such charges. Thus, even under these legislative restrictions, prosecutors still
maintain substantial and unreviewable pre-indictment charging discretion. For example, in any
drug case where the prosecutor does not charge the highest level drug crime possible, no one, espe-
cially the defendant, will complain.
Another approach could be legislatively initiated studies and reviews of areas of potential abuse of
prosecutorial discretion. The movement in New York and elsewhere in the late 19703 to limit poten-
tially abusive prosecutorial behavior under the cloak of grand jury secrecy favorably illustrates the
potential for legislative oversight. See, eg., STAFF OF THE CODES COMMITTEE OF THE NEW YORK
STATE ASSEMBLY, ABUSE OF POWER, 199th Sess. (1976) (on file with the author).
164. Cf. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 34, at 147 (comparing these theoretical legislative committees
to the appropriations committee which exercises control over the S.E.C. by limiting funds available
along with the expenditure of funds).
165. See generally Ifill, Senate's Rule for Its Anti-Crime Bill: The Tougher the Provision, the
Better, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1991, at A6, col. 1 (noting that anti-crime bills in today's Congress gain
support only if they are perceived as stiffening criminal penalties).
166. In an exceptional situation the Connecticut State Legislature refused to rely on
prosecutorial discretion not to prosecute adultery, and instead statutorily voided the state's adultery
law because of marital privacy interests. See supra note 53.
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criminalization is that adding crimes and stiffening penalties provides
legislators a quick and cheap public relations fix for a problem. In the
war on drugs, this is illustrated by the biased and unduly harsh treatment
of crack/cocaine as compared to cocaine. 6 7
Taking unused criminal statutes off the books would, however, be a
significant reform to limit the scope of prosecutorial discretion. An easy
method to assure that all criminal statutes still on the books cover behav-
ior which is still considered criminal would be to have all criminal stat-
utes include sunset provisions, whereby statutes expire on their own at
the end of some stated period, perhaps five or ten years. This would
require periodic reenactment or at least some expression of the public
will. Although care would have to be exercised to avoid having criminal
behavior slip through the system via statutory lapses, this method would
limit the ability of prosecutors to use outdated laws to prosecute some for
behavior no longer considered criminal by a majority.
Some legislative efforts to control prosecutorial discretion also fail to
be particularly effective. Illustrative is the ease with which prosecutors
can evade legislative efforts to restrict prosecutorial discretion with re-
spect to plea bargaining by careful control of which charges are alleged
and negotiated with defense counsel prior to filing charges. That is,
prosecutors can do their plea negotiations at a stage earlier than the trig-
gering event that limits their discretion, usually the filing of formal
charges by way of indictment. This evasive prosecutorial dance can be
witnessed particularly in connection with drug related crimes.'68
Most drafting techniques have not limited prosecutorial discretion.
167. Legislative differentiation between penalties for the possession of powdered cocaine versus
crack/cocaine were declared unconstitutional by a Minnesota judge. This African-American wo-
man, Judge Pamela Alexander, ruled that the state had made an insufficient showing with respect to
the pharmacological differences between the two forms of cocaine to justify the disparate impact of
criminal sanctions on African-Americans. At the intersection of race and gender, this judge per-
ceived disparate treatment for similar offenses as being justified by sterotypes, not science. London,
Judge's Overruling of Crack Law Brings Turmoil, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1991, at B5, col. 3.
168. In New York, once an A-I felony drug indictment is filed, the prosecutor is statutorily
restricted to offer no less than an A-HI felony. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 220.10(5) (McKinney
1990). Prior to the filing of a grand jury indictment, a defendant may waive prosecution by indict-
ment and the prosecutor is essentially free to offer any charge. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW
§ 195.10(2)(b). Even after indictments, prosecutors have permitted improper waivers in an effort to
get witness cooperation against a defendant. By permitting these waivers, the prosecutors evade
statutory restrictions and then are free to offer "illegal" plea bargains as inducements. See People v.
Thomasula, 158 A.D.2d 126, 557 N.Y.S.2d 187 (N.Y.App. Div. 1990), appeal granted, 76 N.Y.2d
897, 561 N.Y.S.2d 559, 562 N.E.2d 884 (1990) People v. Mays, 567 N.Y.S.2d 316, (N.Y.App. Div.
1991). Beyond these restrictions, prosecutors may still offer more lenient sentences than those in the
sentencing guides as inducements to cooperate with the permission of the court. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 70 (McKinney 1987).
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Using the word "shall" in a criminal statute has not meant that the pros-
ecutor affirmatively must do anything. 169 No outrage follows non-en-
forcement. No public, judicial or legislative scrutiny follows secret
decisions made by prosecutors without publicly stated reasons or findings
of fact to establish which criminal laws will be enforced and against
whom. 170  Prosecutors have much discretion and little public
accountability.
iii. Electoral Accountability. By and large electoral accountability
with respect to prosecutors is farcical. To begin with, some of the most
important prosecutors are appointed, not elected. This is particularly
true with respect to federal prosecutors who are appointed by the Presi-
dent and confirmed by the Senate.'7 1 Except for those United States At-
torneys with local political ambitions, 7 2 United States Attorneys are not
accountable to the local electorate. This does not, however, mean that
Justice Department appointments are free from politics. In at least some
Justice Department appointments there is evidence that the process can
become the captive of national political ideologues and not pay heed to
the merits of criminal justice professionals. 173 In any event, except for
President Carter, winning presidential politics since 1968 has not repre-
sented minorities, especially African-Americans. 74 And this has been
reflected in the color and ideology of most regular appointments as
United States Attorney.
With respect to most state prosecutors, while they are elected, 175
there is not much real accountability. 76 Many are nominated either in
169. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 34, at 188-89.
170. Id at 189.
171. 28 U.S.C. § 541 (1988). It is probably true, however, that under the federal system there is
some local input at least where the President and United States Senator(s) are of the same party.
172. See, eg., Glaberson, LAW. At The Bar; Prosecutors and Politics A Feud Reopens the Debate
on the Propriety of Such a Match, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1990, at B6, col. 1 (reporting on the trend of
prosecutors using their positions as a stepping stone for political candidacy).
173. Johnson, Washington at Work, Attorney General Calm Despite Storm at Justice, N.Y.
Times, June 8, 1990, at A12, col. I (reporting on Robert B. Fiske, Jr.'s withdrawal of his candidacy
under pressure of Congressional conservatives).
174. Nixon voters in 1968, 1972 respectively: African-Americans ("AA") = 3%, 13%, Whites
("W") = 59%, 70% Females ("F') = 53%, 61%, Males ("M") = 55%, 68%; Carter 1976: AA
= 95%, W = 47%, F = 51%, M = 51%; Reagan voters in 1980, 1984 respectively: AA = 7%,
9%, W = 63%, 63%, F = 53%, 55%, M = 60%, 62%. W. MILLER & S. TRAUooTr, AMERICAN
NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES DATA SOURCEBOOK 1952 - 1986 316 (1989). Please note that
figures for the 1968 election are only approximations. See id. at 313.
175. See supra note 90.
176. See K.C. DAVIS, supra note 34, at 207-08 n.20 (discussing electoral accountability and the
ABA's Model Department of Justice Act).
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one party jurisdictions or by both parties even where there is a viable two
party system. In addition, the public is generally not very sophisticated
about the prosecutor's role in the criminal justice system. Constant moni-
toring of prosecutors is difficult due to the low visibility of most
prosecutorial decision-making and the expertise needed to evaluate it. 7 '
Due to the low visibility and technical nature of much of prosecu-
tors' work, without an intermediating institution such as the Boards pro-
posed in Part IV below, significant electoral accountability is illusory.
The one major caveat is where the prosecutor himself orchestrates the
public perception of his office through the media. This is sometimes done
for appropriate law enforcement purposes, such as enhancing the deter-
rent effect of law enforcement. 7 ' Prosecutors, however, are capable of
conducting their offices in ways designed to enhance their own political
careers. 7 9 The manner in which Thomas E. Dewey did this on his jour-
ney from Assistant United States Attorney to Governor of New York, to
almost President of the United States, is the commonly accepted model: a
high profile, selectively hard working, incorruptible crusader for public
morality and law and order. 8 ' Public accountability can be effective
when prosecutors are politically ambitious and if done like Dewey, this
need not be all bad. Yet such accountability depends on the happen-
stance of a politically ambitious prosecutor, and by definition it is biased
towards majoritarian power and values.
Although prosecutors are political beasts,'"' one reason American
prosecutors are not effectively accountable to traditionally excluded mi-
norities is because minority votes are submerged within large single rep-
resentative election districts. For outsiders, the choices on election day
are not choices. For the same reasons that there have been complaints of
race discrimination against local legislative bodies 8 2 and elected judiciar-
177. Bubany & Skillern, supra note 43, at 488..
178. The annual ritual of initiating tax prosecutions with great media fanfare just before the tax
filing date each year is an example of the media as a powerful law enforcement mechanism.
179. See Weld For Governor, Boston Globe, Nov. 1, 1990, (Editorial Page), at 22; DeStefano &
Moses, supra note 77; see generally Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1558-59.
180. See generally R. SMrrH, THoMAs E. DEWEY AND His TIMES (1982) (chronicling Dewey's
early days as Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York, his rise to
Special Prosecutor in New York County to Governor 6f New York, and his nearly successful bid for
President of the United States).
181. Morgenthau for District Attorney, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1985, § 1, at 20, col. 1.
182. See eg., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (affirming the lower courts' holdings that
Burke County's at-large election system in Georgia violated the fourteenth and fifteenth amend-
ments rights of their black citizens); see generally Berry & Dye, The Discriminatory Effects of At-
Large Elections, 7 FLA. ST. L. REv. 85 (1979) (discussing the discriminatory effects of at-large dis-
tricting in the election of local legislative bodies); Note, Casting a Meaningful Ballot: Applying One-
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ies,83s the lack of representative nature of local elected prosecutors could
be challenged." 4
Thus, all three types of constraint on prosecutorial discretion, judi-
cial, legislative, and electoral are inadequate to serve both as real and
perceived constraints on potential abuse of prosecutorial discretion.
Given this potential for abuse and the lack of effective constraints on
prosecutors, the question remains whether (1) the prosecutions of drug-
addicted mothers is the result of abusive exercises of discretion, or (2) the
perception of bias is reasonable, even when bias cannot be proven.
III. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND DRUG-ADDICTED
PREGNANT WOMEN: GENDER, COLOR AND CLASS:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF
PROSECUTORIAL SUBORDINATION
[Prosecutorial discretion is] the most dangerous power of the prosecutor [be-
cause it enables prosecutors] to pick people he thinks he should get rather
than pick cases that need to be prosecuted. "5
The early returns suggest that prosecutors are abusing their discre-
tion.186 And this should not be surprising since the executive is capable
of exercising governmental power in arbitrary and capricious ways and
violating other basic values such as antidiscrimination norms with re-
spect to race and gender. Today prosecutors may choose literally at will
Person, One-Vote to Judicial Elections Involving Racial Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 1193 (1989)
[hereinafter Note, Casting a Meaningful Ballot].
183. See Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354(1991) (noting that the existing method of electing
two Louisiana Supreme Court justices impermissibly diluted minority voting strength); HLA v. At-
torney General of Texas, 111 S. Ct 2376 (1991) (discussing a claim of vote dilution in Harris
County, Texas). See generally Butler & Murray, Minority Vote Dilution Suits and the Problem of
Two Minority Groups: Can a Rainbow Coalition Claim the Protection of the Voting Rights Act, 21
PAc. L.J. 619, 624-40 (1990).
184. Under Chisom, since judges qualified as "representatives" for the purposes of the Voting
Rights Act, Chisom, 111 S. Ct. 2354, prosecutors also should qualify as representatives. Whether
there is fertile ground for a litigative challenge to state elected prosecutors' offices because of the
effect that single large district elections has on minorities protected by the Act is a more difficult
question. Although state judicial election cases are in many respects different, for example, multiple
judges versus single prosecutors, similar challenges might be made to state elections of district attor-
neys. Chisom, 111 S. Ct. 2354; HLA, 111 S. Ct. 2376; Rogers, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Berry & Dye,
supra note 182, at 85; Note, Casting a Meaningful Ballot, supra note 182, at 1193.
185. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 62, at 216 (quoting Justice Robert Jackson's Address to the
Second Annual Conference of U.S. Attorneys, April 1940).
186. The combined effects of investigative bias, reporting bias, and prosecutors own biases, leads
to the disproportionate targeting of poor black women. See supra notes 23, 28 and accompanying
text. This would be less visible were it not for the monitoring and reporting function of the ACLU
Reproductive Freedom Project. The Boards suggested in Part IV would serve similar functions,
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to prosecute all, any or no drug-addicted mothers. 8 7 Prosecutorial dis-
cretion in this area, as in many others, 8 ' is virtually unbridled. Such
uncontrolled and substantially unreviewable latitude is an invitation for
abuse.' 8 9
The result of discretion ... has not been to select out the most dangerous
criminals, . . . not the individuals or groups who are the greatest threat to
the social order, but to select out those persons with less power and influ-
ence, persons who are perceived as the greatest nuisance or those who most
offend against middle-class morality or who refuse to knuckle under.190
The statistical evidence that prosecutors discriminate in the investi-
gative, charging, plea, trial and penalty stages of criminal prosecutions is
not conclusive.' 9' At every stage where there is prosecutorial discretion
187. A number of the prosecutions have been dismissed on legal grounds. See Paltrow &
Shende, supra note 27, an ACLU report on written opinions dismissing prosecution of drug-addicted
mothers. Some of these prosecutions have been dismissed on constitutional grounds, Phillips, supra
note 25. Drug mother prosecutions have also been dismissed when they involved misinterpretations
of statutes, DA Will Not Fight Court's Dismissal of Indictment in Fetal Drug Case, Boston Globe,
Nov. 29, 1990, at 54, col. 4. See generally Roberts, supra note 2, at 1462 (arguing that on both
constitutional privacy and equal protection grounds these prosecutions should be set aside).
188. See K.C. DAVIS, supra note 34, at 151-52.
189. Davis argues that all selective enforcement of the law is inherently unjust. See idL at 167,
169-177. Davis optimistically argues that such selectivity can be effectively limited as necessary to
the ends of justice and equal treatment under law. Id at 189.
190. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMrrrEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 146-47 (1971).
191. It is extremely difficult to prove with social scientific certainty whether unarticulated and
perhaps unconscious racism is a significant factor in prosecutions. As the majority in McClesky v.
Kemp points out, one can never quite know whether all of the variables in life have been factored out
so as to prove with certainty that race has been a factor in decision-making. 481 U.S. 279, 311
(1987). This statement proves too much, however. Once natural scientific thought switched its
claim from certain to probable truth, science was forced to acknowledge that all knowledge was
tentative and required some leap of faith to believe. M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: To-
WARD A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1958). It follows that the social sciences can make no
greater claim to certain knowledge than the natural sciences. Cf. P. WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL
SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY 23-24, 127-28 (1963) (stressing the relation between
social institutions and perceptions of reality).
Thus the point is not whether we ever know anything through statistical proof, maybe we do,
maybe we do not. Rather, the question is why individuals or the courts choose to believe or disbe-
lieve, act or not act, on certain facts but not others. Faigman, Normative Constitutional Factfinding:
Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541 (1991).
For example, the Court frequently purports to know things on rather flimsy proof. See Michigan
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2488 (1990) (holding that little evidence of actual
effectiveness of road checkpoints is required); U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (holding that
D.E.A. agents had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was transporting illegal drugs
when he was stopped because, among other things, he paid $2,100 in cash for plane tickets to Miami
and spent only 48 hours there after 20 hours of travel); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 523 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that police officers had "reasonable" suspicion to believe that
defendant was transporting narcotics when he was apprehended because he fit the "drug courier
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there may be discrimination and abuse. What is known for sure is that at
several critical stages the prosecutor's discretion is virtually without any
formal constraints and prosecutors as a group are not presumptively any
less prejudiced than other white Americans in respect to race, gender and
class biases. 192 Prosecutors have unchecked and, under current doctrine,
effectively unreviewable power to select particular individuals or groups
for prosecution on the basis of race or class, notwithstanding that the
case would not ordinarily be criminally prosecuted at all or to the same
degree.
As viewed from the bottom, gender, race and class appear to be
combining to enhance the likelihood that drug-addicted women will be
prosecuted. Whether one agrees with this depends upon the legal
method adopted. As used here, legal method is that which "organizes
the apprehension of truth; it determines what counts as evidence and
defines what is taken as verification."' 93 The legal method and the poli-
tics of criminal law enforcement, as applied to the discretionary selection
of which crimes to investigate and prosecute, has received little attention.
There has been insufficient focus upon the intersection of gender and race
in the ideology of criminal prosecutions.' 94 The prosecution of drug-ad-
dicted mothers is an opportunity to take a glimpse.
A. The Perception of White Male Control, Racism and Classism
For the most part prosecutors are a group of relatively privileged
insider white males with few women and virtually no minorities in the
top or senior position and little minority representation even at more jun-
ior levels."' Head prosecutors are selected either as a result of an ap-
profile"). The Supreme Court similarly does not know other things on strong proof. See Richmond
v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469,470 (1989) (holding that evidence of past discrimination in the construction
industry is not enough to justify the use of racial "quota"); McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311
(1987) (citing and then discounting the "Baldus" death penalty study).
192. See, eg., T. Smith, supra note 89, at 5; Bodenhauser & Wyer, supra note 113, at 268
(showing how stereotypes reinforce and enhance punishment given stigmatized group members
when their behavior is viewed as consistent with the stereotype). See generally G. ALLPORT, THE
NATuRE OF PREJUDICE (1954).
193. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State" An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS
515, 527 (1982).
194. Both Professor Roberts and the Harvard Law Review Developments article are notable
exceptions. Roberts, supra note 2; Developments-Race and the Prosecutor's Charging Decision, supra
note 43, at 1520-56.
195. For example, while there are some junior level prosecutors of color in some prosecutors
offices, the representation of women and especially minorities at senior levels is scant. Cf Dreyfuss,
Harlem's Ardent Voice, N.Y. Times, Jan 20, 1991, (Magazine) at 23 (reporting battle between Afri-
can-American activist minister and prestigious local prosecutor over the lack of administrators from
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pointive political process that relies on networks which have traditionally
excluded women and minorities or as a result of a single district electoral
process. The latter process is not likely to produce women or minorities
in many locations throughout this country. 196 Once the head prosecutor
has been selected, generally he has wide discretion in picking assistant
and administrative prosecutors on any basis he wants. Frequently, the
mirror test is employed, with the prosecutor picking those which look
just like he does.'97 Almost never is someone who looks like the prosecu-
tor's cook, maid, doorman, gardener or shoeshine "boy" picked for su-
pervisory roles. There is little wonder that the perception in some
quarters is that the prosecution of drug-addicted women and minority
males for drug offenses is perniciously biased by those ignorant of and
insensitive to outsiders.198
As was the case with the judiciary, the likelihood that prosecutorial
discretion is being exercised in a biased manner is increased under condi-
tions of ingroup pluralistic ignorance. 199 To the extent that within the
prosecutorial hegemony there is an ingroup mentality, and to the extent
that the prosecutorial group has shared inaccurate views of others not in
the group, like pregnant minority women, prosecutors may perniciously
discriminate in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion with no internally
generated reality check. Where power is exercised in ignorance, it hardly
generates bliss for those under its control. Under such circumstances,
the ingroup sets out in good faith to achieve an objective, for example,
the prosecution of "crime" or the teaching of a lesson to those whom
they perceive to be bad mothers. Yet the ingroup's pursuits are perni-
minority groups on the prosecutor's staff). Indeed a somewhat dated study of United States Attor-
neys concluded that "[m]iddle-aged white males clearly dominate the ranks of recent U.S. attorneys.
No women served between 1961 and 1973. No information on the race of U.S. attorneys exists, but
only a handful of blacks (very likely less than five) have ever received an appointment." J. EISEN-
sTEiN, supra note 57, at 49 (footnote omitted). This author's impression is that there have been
modest and inconsistent changes in the demographics of federal prosecutors' offices since Eisen-
stein's study. But the few exceptions today only serve to highlight the rule that prosecutors' offices,
particularly at senior levels, are predominantly white male professional associations. But see James,
Aggressive Prosecutor. Reena Andrea Raggi, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1986, at B4, col. 6.
196. Although the state judicial election cases are in many respects different, e.g., multiple
judges versus single prosecutors, in some of their aspects similar challenges might be made to state
elections of district attorneys. Chisom v. Roemer, 11 S. CL 2354 (1991); HLA v. Attorney Gen-
eral of Texas, III S. Ct. 2376 (1991); Rodgers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Berry & Dye, supra
note 182; Note, Casting a Meaningful Ballot, supra note 182.
197. For many of the reasons prosecutors are not able to screen minorities from petit juries, see
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (minorities should be included in every other phase of any
legitimate criminal justice system, including that of the police, prosecutors, and judges).
198. Roberts, supra note 2, at 1424. See also Greene, supra note 32.
199. See O'GoRMAN, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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ciously, though unintentionally, subverted and shaped by the group's ig-
norance. The importance of counteracting this effect by including
outgroup perspectives is essential. The process should incorporate differ-
ent group understandings to help minimize the risk of pluralistic
ignorance.
Other world views derived from different legal methods are certainly
possible and could include those offered by current outsider approaches
drawn from feminist and critical race scholars.2"° Given the apparent
biases involved in prosecuting drug-addicted mothers, including the per-
ception that women of color are being unfairly and disparately affected,
both feminist and critical race perspectives could provide some needed
conceptual checks on exercises of prosecutorial discretion in this area.
B. Shedding Prosecutorial Subordination: The Incorporation of Race
and Gender Perspectives
For the purposes of this article, incorporating feminist and race per-
spectives means at least acknowledging: (1) the centrality of gender and
race/culture in the current American context, (2) that there is presently
great economic, social and political inequality revolving around these
categories, (3) that at some level all Americans are responsible for per-
petuating this hegemony, and (4) therefore all must demonstrate a com-
mitment to necessary fundamental transformation. °1 While the position
avowedly adopted here is that both feminism and race/cultural perspec-
tives are in part a function of who we are and what our experiences have
been, they are also a function of choosing the outsider's perspective and
considering it as a legitimate one from which to act.20 2 Thus there is a
claim for uniqueness, although to some extent self-consciously chosen.20 s
200. Gender and race may not be the only sources of outsider perspectives; there is no intent to
erect a new minority/feminist/outsider intellectual hegemony. The intent is only to recognize femi-
nist and critical race scholarship as among the currently promising sources for transformative in-
sight into deep-seated values and goals which we all either share or publicly endorse, including
equality, neutrality and tolerance. These deep-seated values should acknowledge the limits and un-
stated norms of our own points of view. See Minow, Making All the Difference: Three Lessons In
Equality, Neutrality, and Tolerance, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 12 (1989). This article does not survey
feminist or critical race scholarship. The goal here is limited to illustrating how including these
sometimes excluded Weltanschauungs might improve democratic process.
201. Eg., Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, at n.8 (1990).
202. Id at 833. See also M. MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION AND EX-
CLUSION IN AMERICAN LAW 52, 60-65 (1990).
203. Experience is not the only component of this discourse. Certainly all people of good will,
including white men, can examine the ways in which they or their group are privileged by the op-
pression of others, and contribute reason, learn different perspectives and choose to participate in
social transformation. Each of us decides how important "freedom for all" is to us individually.
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In part, the issue of regulating what drugs women can take can be
viewed as a question of power:2" Should women because of their unique
role in the reproductive process be subjected to increased regulation and
control by the state? Is it appropriate to define women in terms of their
unique reproductive function for the purpose of state regulation?2"' This
question has been addressed in an excellent Note in the Harvard Law
Review.20
6
The Harvard Note pointed out the historical interrelationship be-
tween women's reproductive role and the subordination and control of
women. In particular, the contemporary rights discourse which frames
the issue in terms of the rights of the pregnant woman/mother versus
those of the unborn, while useful in contexts where notions of equality
are appropriate such as employment, may not be entirely appropriate in
the context of regulating a woman's behavior during pregnancy. Rights
discourse tends to atomize the relationship between women and their un-
born in a way that makes that which is interdependent and connected,
oppositional. While this serves the law's ends in making the controversy
over women's and unborns' rights manageable within an adversarial, that
is, oppositional, system, it denies the reality of pregnancy.20 7 Pregnancy
is more accurately and better conceptualized as the occasion for greater
recognition of the woman as the best decision-maker, rather than serving
as an occasion for diminishing women's control over their bodies and
that of the unborn.20 8
204. A more structural feminist argument could be made that for many women their poverty is
directly related to a work-place implicitly supported by a structure that favors a conceptualization of
the "ideal worker," one unimpeded by family responsibilities and childbearing. Given the distribu-
tion of family responsibility, this "ideal worker" favors men and structurally disadvantages women
in the work-place. See J. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MIcH.L.REv. 797, 801 (1989).
Again Ms. Hardy illustrates Professor Williams's point; Ms. Hardy had to leave her factory job
because of nausea related to pregnancy. This initial unemployment contributed to the spiral that
lead to her poverty, addiction and some of her other unfortunate life circumstances. Hoffman, supra
note 11, at 44, 53.
205. Cf. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Liver A Phenomenological Critique ofFemi-
nist Legal Theory, 3 WIs. WOMEN'S L. J. 81, 140 (1987) (suggesting that both classic liberal and
radical legalists have accepted Kantian human autonomy, thus denying the profoundly connected
and relational nature of women's lives "because of [their] biological, reproductive role. . ."). The
pertinent and possibly derivative question here is whether it is appropriate for women to be treated
specially under the criminal law because of their reproductive biology. This is a necessary implica-
tion of West's work. To recognize difference for the purpose ofinclusion and to remove barriers may
be very different from the use of difference as a basis for criminally regulating the conduct of an
historically dominated group.
206. Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood, supra note 24, at 1341.
207. Id.
208. The Harvard Note hedges on the question of whether addicted women should have the
same decision-making power as other pregnant women. Id. at 1341-42. This is unfortunate for by
784 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
As a woman of color, Professor Roberts offers a rich perspective on
the prosecution of drug-addicted women. The legal method she advances
is deeply ingrained in the story of the American intersection of color and
gender.209 From slavery to today, African-American women, by far the
group most often targeted by prosecutors during pregnancy, have had
their dignity as human beings denied and their significance reduced to
their ability to produce healthy babies, historically the legal property of
someone else.210 Control of life style, and life itself, has often been dic-
tated by their dual status as both gendered and raced people.211 Indeed,
the legacy of history, cultural expectation and symbolism, all of which
makes the prosecution of these women almost normal, inspires legal ar-
guments uniquely shaped by the intersection of gender and race.2 2
so doing this Note compromises its strongest argument: women should have greater, not less, deci-
sion-making power in this area, and society ought to support them in this role.
There is no compelling reason to compromise this essential position in the context of criminaliz-
ing pregnant women's behavior because a woman uses drugs, legal or illegal, during pregnancy, even
in the case of women addicted to those drugs. First, there is substantial question as to whether
criminalization of such behavior can serve to deter the behavior of addicted women. If deterrence is
not society's goal, then what is? Certainly this is not an area where goals such as punishment or
retribution are appropriate. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scor, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAv § 1.5(a),
at 31-36 (1986); see generally Duncan, "Cradled on the Sea" Positive Images of Prison and Theories
of Punishment, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1239-47 (1988); The Significance of Victim Harm: Booth v.
Maryland and the Philosophy of Punishment in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1303 (1988).
Second, as a practical matter, given the nature of addiction, who else really can change pregnant
women's behavior except the women themselves? Third, is the real problem consistent with the
general position taken in the Note, that society needs to find a way to provide support for positive
behavior by enhancing a woman's ability to make sound decisions and choices in this area. An
obvious example might be providing treatment programs for addicted women who are excluded
from current programs. Thus the solution would appear to be in supporting addicted women, not
knocking them down a notch further with criminal law.
209. See, eg., Bell Scott, Debunking Sapphire: Toward a Non-Racist and Non-Sexist Social Sci-
ence in ALL THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, ALL THE BLAcKs ARE MEN, BUT SOME OF Us ARE BRAVE
85 (1982).
210. Roberts, supra note 2, at 1438.
211. One is "raced" when exogenously placed in a racial category. F. FANON, BLACK SKIN,
Wirr MASKS 109-140 (1967). A true story illustrates the phenomenon of being "raced." Some
young men from the Dominican Republic, who had grown up in a largely Dominican area of New
York City, were recruited to play baseball for a small town college in contemporary Georgia. These
young Latinos were surprised to find that the townspeople regarded them simply as blacks. As one of
the young men stated, "down there they kept referring to us as black. . . I've always thought of
myself as Dominican." Rimer, High School Heroes, After the Last Time Up, N.Y. Times, June 19,
1991, at B3, col. 3.
212. I would supplement Roberts' constitutional arguments with reference to the growing body
of feminist and race theory which looks directly to the thirteenth amendment. While the immediate
prospects for doctrinal acceptance by the courts are probably not great, thirteenth amendment anal-
ysis does offer interesting possibilities for avoiding some of the pitfalls of fourteenth amendment
doctrinal fixation on, and limitation to, formal and not substantive equality. Although Roberts ar-
gues primarily based on the Equal Protection Clause and Constitutional privacy doctrines, much of
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Perhaps most illustrative of the power and enlightenment in Rob-
ert's method is her description of practices during slavery within the con-
text of the current prosecutions of drug-addicted African-American
mothers. Under slavery, the white male masters would punish black
pregnant women by whipping them as they lay face down on the ground.
The ground would have been prepared by digging a whole the approxi-
mate size of her belly. This hole was to protect the fetus - the master's
future slave- while the mother was being whipped. Such punishment,
Roberts asserts, is the "powerful metaphor for the evils of a fetal protec-
tion policy that denies the humanity of the mother." '213
Like the shaking of a kaleidoscope on one's world view, Professor
Roberts draws upon the historical and continuing intersection of race
and gender power relationships and the rationales used to support them
to inform and contextualize our understanding of the value judgments
reflected in the decisions to prosecute poor drug-addicted African-Amer-
ican mothers. These insights are particularly useful when the social dif-
ferentiation, prestige and power of prosecutors are factored into the
likelihood of prosecutor's misunderstanding both the phenomenon of ad-
dicted mothers and the symbolic and otherwise real significance of prose-
cuting these mothers of color.214
Perspectives like those advanced by Roberts give more profound
meaning to the situation of the poor drug-addicted mothers of color.
Having a baby may address deep-seated needs of a person in the dispir-
ited position of many addicted pregnant women. This phenomenon is
reflected in a statement quoted by the recently retired Professor Gerda
Lerner from an anonymous woman of color, apparently herself not a
drug addict:
They came telling us not to have children .... There isn't anything
they don't want to do to you, or tell you to do. They tell you you're bad,
and worse than others, and your lazy.... Then they say we should look
different, and eat different-use more of the protein. I tell them about the
the underlying premise of her arguments also appears to resonate in thirteenth amendment argu-
ments with respect to both African-Americans, see, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 124, at 1118-20;
Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against Racial Use of
Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1990). For an example of gender-based thirteenth
amendment argumentation, see generally L. TRIBE, AMEmCAN CONsTrrUTIoNAL LAW, § 15-10 at
1353 (1988) (characterizing the denial of federal assistance for poor women seeking to exercise their
constitutional right to abortion as a form of involuntary servitude).
213. Roberts, supra note 2, at 1438.
214. Cf O'GORMAN, supra note 4, at 153 (noting the danger that where there is pluralistic
ignorance, false beliefs will be validated against a common cultural background reflecting social
differentiation, prestige and power).
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prices, but they reply about "planning"--planning, planning.... The truth
is, they don't want you to have any [kids], if they could help it.
To me, having a baby inside me is the only time I'm really alive. I know
I can make something do something, no matter what color my skin is, and
what names people call me.... You can see the little one grow... and you
feel there must be some hope... [The birth control people are] not going to
give us [the economic resources] they have .... They just want us to be a
poor version of them, only without our children and our faith in God and
our tasty fried food, or anything.
They'll tell you we are "neglectful"; we don't take proper care of the
children. But's that a lie, because we do, until we can't any longer, because
the time has come for the street to claim them.
215
To the extent these views accurately reflect the dissonance between
well-intentioned state intervention and the perceptions of women and
men of color, the prosecution of drug-addicted mothers of color is not
likely to have the intended result. These prosecutions ignore the com-
plexity of race and gender consciousness.2 16 Such consciousness leads to
the perception that these prosecutions reflect prosecutorial social engi-
neering designed to force the targeted women to abort their babies or
otherwise not have children.217 The enforcement effort is seen as only
serving to further alienate and create a hostile environment; it does not
positively influence behavior. To minimize these risks, prosecutorial dis-
cretion should be reviewed by and exposed to some outsider voices in the
chorus of justice.
This is not to suggest there is one essential and unitary voice.
Within the veil of color or gender there are significant differences as well
215. Having a Baby Inside Me Is the Only Time I'm Really Alive, in BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE
AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 313-14 (G. Lerner ed. 1973) (quoting R. COLES, CHILDREN
OF CRISIS 368-69 (1964) (emphasis added)). Ms. Hardy expressed similar sentiments. With parents
who are Jehovah's Witnesses, she felt a child "was the one thing in the world that was mine. He was
part of me, my body." Hoffman, supra note 11, at 44, col. 5.
216. See generally P. Williams, On Being the Object of Property, 14 SIGNS 5, 7-11 (1988) (dis-
cussing how race consciousness is shaped by the complex history of master-slave relationships).
217. Se e.g., Lev, Judge Is Firm on Forced Contraception, but Welcomes an Appeal, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 11, 1991, at A17, col.1 (reporting on California judge's order that Ms. Darlene Johnson,
an African-American woman with four children who was then pregnant with a fifth who was a
convicted child abuser, thief, and bad check writer, have a birth control device implanted in her
arm). This is part of a long tradition in America, one that emanates from slavery and the idea that
black women existed totally under the control of white men, having or not having babies or families
subject to white will. These attempts by whites to control the childbearing of women of color has
continued through to today. The current view is that if a woman does not have the economic re-
sources, a husband to care for her, and the other accoutrements of the white middle-class standard of
motherhood, she has not the right to have children. Yet this reduction of motherhood to economics,
and the adverse impact on women of color, has existed from the time of controversy. See P. Wil-
liams, supra note 216, at 7-11.
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as commonalities.21 Women of color are both the same as and different
from white women.219 And men of color are not only different from (and
the same as) white men (and women); they are also different from (and
the same as) women of color.22° Similarly, women of color are the same
as and different from men of color. But this virtually endless process of
differentiation and identification, multiples of consciousness ever chang-
ing and doubling back upon themselves,22' illuminates the need for re-
specting difference and not homogenizing it.22 2 Yet we must also give
recognition to the categories in which people are subordinated.223
Developing ways to include outsider voices provides the hope that
transformation can be accomplished, or at least begun from within the
present constitutional framework.224 But the insights that outsider juris-
prudences offer suggest that we should not be joining these (mostly)
white male prosecutors who want to dominate, punish and control drug-
addicted pregnant women. Supporting the criminalization of behavior
that draws more from the structural aspects of traditional gender, race
and class oppression, rather than real criminality, has a tendency to di-
vide those of us who should be allies.225 What then should be done about
218. Some of the complexity of sameness/difference along the intersection of race and gender is
captured by Professor Judy Scales-Trent's essay on being a white/black women and raising a son.
Scales-Trent, Commonalities" On Being Black and Whit, Different, and the Same, 2 YALE J. OF L.
& FEMINISM 305 (1990).
219. See Harris, supra note 5, at 608-16 (recognizing that the notions of gender essentialism and
coherent personhood expressed in white feminism denies women of color the complexity of their
realities, which are not singular, coherent, and uniform).
220. This is probably one of the most underdeveloped areas of scholarship. Some sisters know
what is wrong with brothers, but brothers have had little to say about being brothers in their own
voice. But see D. BELL, supra note 7.
221. Cf. Thomas, A House Divided Against Itself: A Comment on "Mastery, Slavery, and Eman-
cipation," 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 1481, 1505-15 (1989).
222. Cf Harris, supra note 5. Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. CHL LEGAL F. 115, 131.
See generally M. MINOW, supra note 202. Similarly, this author does not suggest that the much
maligned "undifferentiated white male" is any more a uniform reality then those of us who speak in
different voices are uniform realities. For more than one reason, we too must be careful not to
homogenize other people, including white men. At the same time, the reality in America is that
white males are privileged by presumptions of intelligence, authority and normalcy in both real and
symbolic ways. Straight white upper-middle class males still define the "neutral standard," the norm
and control, the comparative center of political and social power, as well as individual and corporate
wealth. Outsider voices constantly must be legitimized in relation to a white male standard.
223. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REv.
1763, 1776 (1990).
224. But see Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory - And Its Future, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 223,
258-59 (1981).
225. Scarlet lettering divides groups who would have common interests in creating safe harbors
from life's rough seas for poor and minority addicted women. It separates those in need of support
from their most likely allies, other law abiding women, minorities and others sensitive to the view
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these abusive prosecutions?226
Whatever the positions representative outsiders would take, if the
discretionary use of prosecutorial power is thoroughly exposed and in-
formed by outsider perspectives, other features of democracy may take
hold to reshape discretionary executive power. The result may more
closely approximate and reflect the will of all of the people, a more com-
plete informed composite citizenry, not just what some prosecutors think
is best for society and in particular for poor and minority women and
children. Thus new and improved prosecutorial democracy is this au-
thor's aspiration.2 27 The Boards proposed below are one means of pro-
portionately incorporating minority and hopefully outsider perspectives
in the evaluation of prosecutorial functions without denying majoritarian
selection of prosecutors. Whether this inclusion of different perspectives
will make a difference in part depends on whether including minorities in
discussions which concern minorities may affect the discussion and out-
come. Inclusion will affect the outcome to the extent that "pluralistic
ignorance" and American racism in the later part of the twentieth cen-
tury depends upon being able to maintain self-deluding neutrality, appar-
ent fairness and the legal fiction of racial impartiality.228 I hope this sort
of procedural reform will work.229
from down under and the dangers of unconstrained executive power. Exposing the potentially arbi-
trary, oppressive and divisive tendencies of these prosecutions through the prisms of outsider per-
spectives may enhance both individual and group consciousness of prosecutorial injustice through
democratic process and provide a means of increased control over such injustice.
226. Arguments about whether the prosecution of addicted pregnant women should be treated
specially must be made with great care so as not to fall into either of the traps discussed by Professor
Williams. To the extent that the argument is that poor, pregnant, addicted women of color should
be treated the same, the question becomes the same as whom? If the standard is the 19th century,
desexualized domesticated Victorian women, then these sisters have been condemned before the
charges are brought against them. See generally CLiNToN, supra note 46. On the other hand, to the
extent it is argued that poor, pregnant, addicted women of color should be treated differently, the
risk is that these sisters will be so marginalized that they may be divested of responsibility for, and
power over, their own decisions, dehumanized, and thus treated in the traditional ways women of
color have been treated since slavery. Roberts, supra note 2, at 1455. The solution to this dilemma
may lie in understanding "partializing social constructions," rather than ignoring them, and in rec-
ognizing the complexity of human uncertainty principles. See P. Williams, supra note 216, at 11.
227. I am mindful of Derrick Bell's admonition that reform is not transformation. See D.
BELL, supra note 7, at 75. This notwithstanding, I too persist.
228. Lawrence, supra note 78.
229. Since, as Professor Tribe states, any procedure which entails the notion of protecting mi-
norities is ultimately predicated upon a substantive vision, the success of these Boards would be
measured by the degree to which it contributed to more prosecutorial justice, especially for outsiders.
See Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063,
1077 (1980) (protecting minorities through procedure requires substantive theory).
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IV. NEw PRSPECTIVES ON REFORMING PROSECUTOR AL
DISCRETION
Combatting the ossification of race discourse requires a concerted effort to
inject into the discourse the voices ofpeople too long ignored and the power of
experiential knowledge too long discounted.23
This part of the article moves beyond criticism to possibilities for
reform, including the laying of an informational foundation for the trans-
formation of oppressive prosecutorial discretion. Having already high-
lighted some of the ways in which the prosecutorial function can be
arbitrary, capricious and biased especially along gender, class and race/
cultural lines, this part of the article first reviews some suggested reforms
and then suggests a community based vehicle to develop information for
further reform and new transformative models of prosecutorial justice.
The vehicle suggested by this author, Prosecutorial Research, Informa-
tion and Reporting Boards, blends improved monitoring, oversight and
review of the execution of the criminal law by prosecutors with the inclu-
sion of gender, class and race/cultural perspectives on law enforcement
found in outsider communities. These Boards' transformative potential
would inhere in their capacity to raise consciousness and provide the fac-
tual seeds around which new majorities of progressive people might
coalesce.
A. Something Old: Checks, Balances and Reform
The concept of checks and balances as applied to prosecutorial dis-
cretion is often limited to notions of invoking interbranch or separate
governmental power bases to overrule or delegitimize an exercise of exec-
utive power. Yet as Davis points out, the concept need not be so lim-
ited.231 Checking might also be employed by intrabranch checks, such as
prosecutorial peer group review, perhaps pursuant to some written inter-
nal policy guidelines.232 Similarly, one could institute an internal admin-
230. Bell, Higgins & Shu, Racial Reflections: Dialogues in the Direction of Liberation, 37
U.C.L.A. L.REv. 1037, 1043 (1990).
231. K.C. DAvis, supra note 34, at 142.
232. Many United States Attorney's Offices and state prosecutors already use a variation on
peer review by making it necessary to have assistant prosecutors at the same or slightly varying
levels of seniority and authority within the prosecutor's office formally sign and approve any actual
complaint or indictment authorization. See generally K.C. DAviS, supra note 34, at 143-44. Davis
gives extensive hypotheticals and examples of how an internal policy of situational rule-making
might proceed. Id. at 219-222, 225; accord Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1543-45 (discussing the
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION (1980); and
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istrative appellate tribunal.233 Legislative committee staffs could also
exert pressure to check and constrain prosecutorial discretion,234 as
could the press and official ombudsman.235
The proposal made by this author is reformatory in calling for in-
dependent non-judicial review of exercises of prosecutorial behavior.236
The Boards proposed by this author are, however, also transformative in
emphasizing the inclusion of different voices in shaping the monitoring
and reporting fumction of the Boards. Before detailing the features of my
suggested Boards, a brief evaluative review of the reforms suggested by
others is in order.
Professor Vorenberg in his provocative treatment of prosecutorial
discretion first mentions the grand jury and judicial preliminary hearings
as a potential but relatively ineffectual and infrequent external limit on
prosecutorial charging discretion.237 While this author is not as pessi-
mistic as some about the ability of good defense counsel to influence the
outcome of the charging process before the grand jury,238 obviously the
effectiveness of the grand jury as a potential check is for the most part
limited to those cases where defense counsel are available and can be
effective. This resource factor will disadvantage many, like the poor and
minority women being prosecuted for delivering babies exposed to drugs.
Poor drug-addicted minority women generally will not be able to mount
an effective defense before grand juries or preliminary hearing judicial
officers.
Similarly, Professor Vorenberg concludes that internal limitations
NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE COLLAR CRIMES
(1980)).
233. See, eg., K.C. DAVIS, supra note 34, at 144-46. While this proposal would help regularize
the administration of prosecutorial discretion, it is not likely by itself to correct for gender, class or
race/cultural biases. Such biases are likely to be shared among prosecutors, and their treatment
requires both: 1) increased internal diversity among prosecutors, and 2) the external development of
outsider perspectives which can be injected into mechanisms for reviewing and controlling
prosecutorial discretion.
234. Id. at 146-50.
235. Id. at 150-51.
236. Significantly, one element that this author's proposal shares with Davis's idea of
ombudsmen is that the proposed Boards would have no power to correct injustice or maladministra-
tion except by criticizing and persuading. Id at 150. No direct constraint on prosecutorial discre-
tion is suggested at this time. Often well-intentioned efforts to curb discretion in the criminal justice
system merely results in shifts of the locus of discretion and no net improvement. Diverging from
Davis's approach, this author would not make the Board a single officer or for that matter a part of
the executive as Davis suggests for his proposed ombudsmen. Id. Rather, the Board would serve as
an independent watchdog or monitoring agency.
237. Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1537.
238. Id at 1538.
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on prosecutorial discretion, such as self-constraint, have some force in
regularizing the administration of justice. These intraoffice controls es-
sentially do little more than reallocate unreviewable power within the
prosecutor's office to higher level decisionmakers. 3 9 For example, where
pre-charging conferences with the defendant and her counsel are pro-
vided, "screening conferences" do not limit the overall policy setting dis-
cretion of the prosecutor's office. Regularizing "screening conferences"
might help in making prosecutorial decision-making more fair and con-
sistent; but it would not eliminate the great discretion to set policy at
higher levels within the prosecutor's offices. Moreover, effective "screen-
ing conferences" presupposes that the poor would have a meaningful
right to counsel at this "critical stage" in the criminal proceedings.' °
Vorenberg believes in direct limitations of prosecutorial power
through guidelines.241 While this author concurs in many of Professor
Vorenberg's judgments and opinions about how guidelines could improve
prosecutorial justice,242 determining what guidelines would be appropri-
ate is difficult without adequate data about current practices and policies.
Similarly, without adequate independent information and evaluative
study it is difficult to determine whether guidelines once implemented are
adequate or effective in achieving their intended objectives. 4 Thus, the
enhanced information this author's proposed Boards could generate
would be a precursor and complement to Vorenberg's proposal.
In light of these doctrinal, legislative, and democratic institutional
limitations on prosecutorial discretion, "we must try to find [other] ways
to minimize discretionary injustice."' 2 Some prosecutors argue that
239. Id. at 1544-45.
240. Compare U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 237 (1967) (right to counsel attached at post-
indictment line-up which was a "critical stage" because its results "may well [have] settle[d] the
accused's fate and rendered the trial itself a mere formality"); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9
(1970) (pre-indictment, preliminary hearing was a critical stage at which the right to counsel at-
tached); with U.S. v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187, 192 (1984) (administrative segregation of federal
prisoners after disciplinary hearing was not a critical stage because it was before the initiation of
advisory judicial process against defendants). While not likely to be judicially mandated by the
Rehnquist Court, such a right could be provided by legislatures to fulfill their independent obligation
to further constitutional values. Constitutional values need not be protected solely by the courts.
Legislatures should be urged to provide counsel generously to all, including the lower middle class,
so that all have access to criminal defense counsel as do the wealthy.
241. Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1562-65. Accord Developments - Race and the Prosecutor's
Charging Decision, supra note 43, at 1550-51.
242. See also UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECU-
TION 1 (1980) (supporting the desirability of having a general statement of principles which guide
prosecutors in the discharge of their duties); W. SEYMOUR, supra note 40, at 228-239.
243. Cf Developments - Race and the Prosecutor's Charging Decision, supra note 43, at 1551.
244. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 34, at 216. Davis limits his inquiry to individuals with
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there should not be specific policies and guidelines set forth as to which
cases will or will not be prosecuted. To do so, it is argued, would reduce
the deterrent effect of the criminal law, for if potential criminals believe
that they might be prosecuted even though in fact they will not, society
still obtains some "free" deterrent effect from the unpredictability of
criminal law enforcement.245 This claim of "free" deterrence depends
upon two unproven assumptions: that potential criminals are (1) unin-
formed of the actual risks of prosecution and (2) rational decisionmakers.
Both assumptions may not comport with reality. First, assume that the
prosecutor's office is not the only source of information about the likeli-
hood of getting caught and prosecuted for particular crimes. Potential
criminals have access to fairly good anecdotal information on who is get-
ting arrested and prosecuted for what. Street level experience may more
accurately reflect what actual police and prosecutorial policies are than
those arguing "free" deterrence are aware of or acknowledging.
Second, for many potential criminals, and especially drug addicts,
many of the decisions are not rational in the sense required for there to
be any possibility of "free" deterrence or perhaps any deterrence.246 Spe-
cifically with respect to drug addicts, it is not at all clear that general
deterrence theories have much to tell us about their behavior.247
Moreover, beyond whether "free" deterrence even exists, the ques-
tion remains as to the liberty cost of this "free" deterrence. If prosecu-
tors choose who will and will not be prosecuted with no external check
or accountability, then perhaps the cost for this "free" deterrence is too
high a charge for equal treatment, fairness, and liberty. 248 The burden
should be on the government to show that the free deterrence versus lib-
erty calculation balances in favor of the government.2 49 Prosecutors
should have to publicly justify their prosecutorial decisions within this
resource allocation framework. 250
prosecutorial discretionary power. From the "outsiders'" perspective, this view is too restricted;
some of the peculiar aspects of the prosecution of drug-addicted women may be due to hegemonic
group considerations having to do with gender, race and class perspectives.
245. Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1549-50.
246. Greene, supra note 32, at 463 n.17.
247. Schmoke, supra note 160, at 511.
248. Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1555 (noting that the risk of unequal treatment created by
standardless discretion is troubling not only on due process grounds but also because it invites arbi-
trary and capricious decision-making which will fall most harshly on racial and ethnic minorities,
social outcasts, and the poor). See also J. ELY, supra note 97, at 135-79 (asserting that prosecutors in
low visibility discretionary decision-making are likely to be sensitive to social station and other fac-
tors that should not bear on their decisions).
249. Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1550.
250. Indeed, it can be argued that fairness requires lower class criminals to get the same regular-
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The public should be aware of the costs of the incremental deter-
rence in connection with cases that the prosecutor is not going to prose-
cute. And the choice of how much deterrence is worth how much
potential abuse and discretion is an appropriate subject for public disclo-
sure, debate, and resolution in a democracy. For example, if the prosecu-
tor decides that no addicted women are going to be prosecuted for
exposing their un- or newly born children to marijuana or alcohol, a cer-
tain amount of deterrence probably would be lost. Yet what would be
gained is that these woman could not be arrested, booked, and plea bar-
gained, leveraged or bootstrapped into other domestic and family law
consequences. This is a policy decision which is appropriately reviewed
by some specialized body independent of the prosecutor's office; ulti-
mately, it is a policy choice about which the people should be given the
information and the opportunity to decide.
There also should be some level of consistency in prosecutorial strat-
egies.25 1 As now is the case, prosecutors do not even necessarily know
whether individual decisions are being made consistently. The system
depends on the chance that someone involved in today's decision remem-
bers yesterday's decision and the reasons for it. While this may work at
times, this is hardly a methodology for assuring justice in the sense of
equal treatment for similarly situated addicted mothers on Monday and
Friday.
And to the extent that such policies are articulated but just not pub-
lic, this gives unfair advantage to those who regularly work with the
same prosecutors. Such practitioners will have cumulative experience
which will allow them to perceive and apprehend non-public policies and
inconsistencies with such policies. This, of course, disadvantages those
not represented by attorneys who are regulars in the collegial adversary
process. 252
ized decision-making and notice as do white collar criminals in the cases of tax law, antitrust and
securities criminal enforcement. In all three of these areas and others, the "free deterrence" bought
from potential violator ignorance is foregone in the interest of the positive benefits from complete
and open governmental guidance. Cf. K.C. DAVIS, supra note 34, at 196-203, 205-07. Yet just be-
cause the society may not be willing to admit any positive benefit from the underlying activities in
lower-class circumstances involving illegal drugs or gambling does not justify providing guidance to
some but not to others. These value judgments are substantially class-based and not unanimous. In
any event, there is no reason that the policy choices being made should not be openly and publicly
discussed.
251. Prosecutors may not be legally compelled to be consistent from one case to another. See,
e.g., Newman v. U.S., 382 F.2d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
252. The most frequent institutional opponent is usually a legal aid or public defenders office.
However, in those cases where lawyers are appointed or retained who do not regularly represent
defendants in that jurisdiction, the potential for lapses is greater.
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B. Something New: The Prosecutorial Research Information and
Reporting Boards - Study and Information as Predicates to
Justice and Transformative Coalitions
[Shug] say, Miss Celie. You better hush. God might hear you....
Let'im hear me, I say. If he ever listened to poor colored women the
world would be a different place....
... [Shug] say: Tell me what your God look like, Celie....
... I say. He big and old and tall and graybearded and white....
... Sort of bluish-gray [cool eyes]....
... I know white people never listen to colored, period. If they do,
they only listen long enough to be able to tell you what to do....
... [Shug say] .... God is inside you and inside everybody else. You
come into the world with [it]....
... God ain't a he or a she, but a it....
... [and says Celie] it want to be loved, just like the bible say.2"'
Living at the intersection of categories of oppression can produce
insights of socially transformative potential. Looking out from the van-
tage points of Shug, Celie or the real Kimberly Hardy, the prosecution of
poor drug-addicted minority women reveals camouflaged social struc-
tures and tendencies. Yet to understand and include these truths, to ap-
prehend "it," we must proceed carefully, learning new techniques for
listening as we go. Interactions must be genuine and not patronize these
different voices; these voices must be treated with respect and dignity.
Moving from the insights of Shug, Celie, and Kimberly Hardy, to a
transformed and less oppressive society will not be easy, since there is no
predetermined path. To begin this process in the context of prosecutorial
justice, this author suggests establishing Prosecutorial Research, Infor-
mation and Reporting Boards.
These Boards would generate information for democracy. The in-
formation generated on the prosecutorial function would aim to improve
democratic oversight of prosecutors and hear those on the other side of
criminal prosecutions, disproportionately poor and minority victims, de-
fendants and communities affected by crime. These Boards would tell
the story of not only what prosecutors were doing but also what prosecu-
253. A. WALKER, THE COLOR PURPLE 164-68 (1982).
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tors were not doing. By orchestrating in counterpoint to prosecutors'
dominant voices, these Boards could enhance democracy.
The duties of the proposed Boards would include collecting the
kinds of information about individual cases and decisions that Professor
Vorenberg has suggested be maintained by the prosecutors' offices.2"'
Explanations for why individual cases were handled the way they were
would be useful data in verifying that prosecutorial justice is adminis-
tered fairly. Yet as a prelude to social transformation, the Board's func-
tion would go further.
Critical problems with prosecutorial discretion arise because no one
systemically monitors the cumulative effect of prosecutorial decision-
making as it affects groups of people.2"' In this area and others, data
needs to be systemically collected in order to discern and project realities
of the underrepresented, realities not revealed by the current focus on
individual cases.256 By reasons of demographics, pluralistic ignorance
and doctrinal anemia, the judiciary is not itself a likely monitor. And the
scarce efforts of the private or the public interest bars and the media are
neither sufficient, democratically responsive nor systemic. As illustrated
by the prosecution of drug-addicted mothers, the question of whether
poor African-American women are being unfairly treated is known only
because of the happenstance observations of a few committed lawyers
and sensitive journalists keeping a watchful eye on prosecutors.
The Boards this author suggests would have the power not only to
require the prosecutor to record why particular decisions were made, but
254. Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1565.
255. Indeed, academic observers have characterized prosecutorial discretion as often haphazard
or random vis-a-vis particular individuals. Eg., Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1548-49. These obser-
vations are, however, myopic. That which appears random or haphazard may actually reflect biases
against individuals because of their status as members of disfavored groups. Ascendent white male
dominated perspectives and the perspectives of many outsiders sharply disagree as to whether gen-
der, class and race impacts are presumptively coincidental in an essentially individualistic society or
whether disparate impact is a reflection of deep seated structural and attitudinal group-based Ameri-
can biases. Outsiders frequently do not trust the rhetoric of color-blind individualism, seeing it more
as a device to obfuscate group-based realities. Indeed, from our outsider perspective it is insider
white males who talk the most about a color-blind individual-based America. These ascendant white
males invariably make such utterances in the process of denying the advantages which have accrued
to them because of the color of their skin and their gender.
256. The Board should have authority to study policy and program alternatives to the use of the
criminal justice system to solve social problems. Prosecutors and courts are simply not qualified to
make these types of comparisons, which majority-controlled legislatures may not find politically
expedient to undertake. For example, what are the economic costs of jailing mothers and breaking
up families compared to treatment and family support costs. Cf Lee, supra note 13 (describing a
program being used as an alternative to jailing drug abusing mothers and taking away their
children).
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also to require other kinds of data be maintained which might be useful
in discerning patterns of prosecutorial (in)justice.2 " The EEOC now
requires this sort of data collection of some employers.258  The Board's
data collection process could be encoded in ways that would protect con-
fidentiality and preserve the integrity of criminal law enforcement.259
Even in these cases information, however sanitized, eventually should be
disclosed to the Boards. The Boards should have presumptive power to
require the collection and review of any data they think useful.
The Boards would operate with the assistance of professional coun-
sel and staff services from one or more independent criminal justice re-
search agencies like the Vera Institute.2 ° With such expert assistance
the Boards would study its local prosecutor's office, whether federal or
state, and issue periodic reports on topics of its choice to the prosecutor,
the legislature, the courts for possible admission into evidence,26 and
most importantly to the public, on the ways in which prosecutorial dis-
cretion is exercised.
The composition of these proposed Boards is instrumental to their
intended missions. Each Board should consist of people from small com-
munity-based districts within the prosecutor's overall jurisdiction. The
representation of districts on their respective Board should be in propor-
257. Even if Boards on which outsiders were the dominant voice concluded that there was no
group-based patterns such Boards would serve a useful purpose by exploring why perceptions of
oppressive prosecutorial tendencies persist within minority communites and amongst some whites.
258. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-8(c) (requiring every employer
subject to EEOC reporting requirement make, keep and report to the EEOC records relevant to
determinations of whether unlawful employment practices are being or have been committed).
259. Indeed, the prosecutor ought to be armed with the right to go to court to prevent the
disclosure of any information which might compromise an ongoing investigation or any person iden-
tified before the appropriate Board.
260. The Board should have access to the professional services and advice of criminal justice
system oversight professionals like those found in the Vera Institute of Criminal Justice. See, ag.,
STATUS REPORT: WORK OF THE VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE PURSUANT TO A CONTRACT WITH
THE NEW YORK CrrY POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY MAYOR FOR PUB-
LIC SAFETY 1990 (on file with author). Such counsel to the Board might prove invaluable by
preventing the Board from reinventing the wheel when structuring studies, collecting, and evaluating
statistical data. This author, however, would disfavor reliance on criminal justice professionals in
lieu of a Board because no matter how expert such professionals may be they are no substitute in
theory or practice for community-level input and control of the oversight function. A Board drawn
from the community might have avoided the rather tense situation which occurred in a case like
Howard Beach by openly reporting and encouraging debate on local prosecutorial and police policies
which discouraged victims of racist crimes from cooperating with police and prosecutors who had
initially assumed that the black victims had been the perpetrators. See HYNES, supra note 125.
261. See eg., FED. R. EVID. 803(8); Wilson v. Beebe, 743 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1984) (stating that
the district court did not err when it admitted into evidence a memorandum written by a State
Trooper District Commander pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 803(8)(A) or 803(8)(C)).
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tion to the number of crimes prosecuted within the last two or three
years from that district.262 Through this mechanism the representation
of each Board should reflect the districts most directly affected by crime,
generally the communities of minorities and the poor. This or some simi-
lar mechanism should help incorporate outsider perspectives into law en-
forcement in a manner similar to that used in community-based
policing,263 in the sense that it inextricably links community input into
an ongoing and dynamic process of reviewing law enforcement priori-
ties.2 Yet given these Boards' purely informational functions, they
could give deserved greater weight to outsider perspectives without com-
promising majoritarian control over prosecutorial selection.265
This goal of greater inclusion of outsider voices, hopefully including
people with both feminist and critical race perspectives,266 while not cur-
tailing majoritarian control, should offer opportunities for using outsider
perspectives to help transform our system of prosecutorial justice. Femi-
262. Authentic representation of the perspective of the communities from which most crimes
are prosecuted would be facilitated by weighing the perspective proportionately in favor of the target
communities. This approach relies on the fact that those communities targeted for prosecution are
connected through family, friends and community with those who are most often affected as victims
and defendants.
Yet another alternative might be structured in much the way that the new Districting Commis-
sion in New York City was structured. This Commission expressly attempted to balance its compo-
sition in terms of the categories of race/ethnicity that are protected under the Federal Voting Rights
Act. See NEw YORK, N.Y., CrrY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 50(7)(b)(1) (1989). The rationale is that
since the Board does not serve a direct operational governmental function but provides perspectives
and reports on the execution of the criminal law by prosecutors, the Board should include local
perspectives of gender, race and class and at least in some jurisdictions, perspectives based on sexual
orientation. The method of selection of Board members should reflect notions of strong not weak
democracy. See B. BARBER, supra note 262. Methodologically it might be possible to avoid express
gender/race/ethnicity-based selections by making representation reflect the degree to which particu-
lar areas are targeted and by relying on local electoral processes to be inclusive.
263. James, Brown's Gospel: Community Policing, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1991, at B1, col. 2
(discussing the values and dynamics of community policing); Blumenthal, Putting Cops on the Beat:
Easier Theory Than Practice, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1991, at E5, col. 1.
264. See, ag., Blumenthal, A Special Patrol Hacks at the Roots of Crime, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15,
1991, at Al, col. 2 (reporting on minority community patrol officer's sensitive execution of the law
with an eye towards prevention, not prosecution).
265. One of the long-term benefits from this community-based Board might be to serve as a
consciousness-raising forum on the effects of and alternatives to law enforcement. This elevated
awareness might in turn catalyze a new majority coalition to create and support alternatives to our
current overreliance on the criminal law to solve all social maladies.
266. The mechanism prescribed would not assure representation of feminists or critical race
theorists. The inclusion, however, of more politically active outsiders on the Board ought to infuse
those perspectives into the Board insofar as they affect the thinking of these outsiders. Moreover,
Board members could seek the expertise of legal, social science and other experts as warranted.
Presumably some of this expertise would reflect the scholarship of feminists and critical race
theorists.
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nist perspectives on male domination, when joined with critical race per-
spectives reflecting the slave and other experiences of people of color,
offer transformative coalition possibilities. The union and reunion of
feminists and colored perspectives hold great promise in revealing more
of the spectrum of life that generally should be brought to bear on
prosecutorial discretion, and in particular, on prosecuting drug-addicted
mothers. Part of the promise of some outsider perspectives is their abil-
ity to raise new questions when traditional patterns of oppression reap-
pear, but to do so without substituting a new single standard of either the
unitary woman or the unitary minority. These perspectives allow the
possibility of including human differences without creating a new, single-
perspectived normative hegemony.
The proposed Boards might have great utility to prosecutors, to
courts, to the legislature in its oversight function, to the media and ulti-
mately to the public by creating an informed public with the facts to
act.2 67 The ways in which this information might be helpful in bringing
prima facie cases based on race or gender discrimination even under cur-
rent judicial doctrine are obvious.268 What is suggested here, however, is
primarily a non-judicial method for developing and utilizing information
with a different perspective on prosecutors, the legislatures and in public
discourse.
Successful Boards would serve as a two-way mirror in front of the
prosecutor. On the reflective side of the mirror, the prosecutor may bet-
ter see his own actions and institute reforms. And on the other side, the
see-through side of the two-way mirror, the legislature and the interested
public can examine the prosecutor's patterns of behavior.269
267. The term "citizen" is intentionally avoided because of its exclusive characteristics, particu-
larly in respect of undocumented persons. The aim of this author's proposal is to include as many
underrepresented people as possible on the Boards. Being part of a high crime community is suffi-
cient to qualify for participation on the proposed Boards.
268. Boards could generate at least the statistical components of antidiscrimination attacks. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); cf Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1568-72 (inferring
that a substantive review of prosecutorial charging and bargaining decisions would aid defendants in
proving an unjustifiable deviation from stated policies). Information generated by the Board might
also be used to combat judicial pluralistic ignorance and otherwise to assist transforming the
judiciary.
269. While the proposed Board may invite comparison to the much maligned New York City
Police Department Civilian Complaint and Review Board (CCRB), the two could not be more dif-
ferent. Unlike the CCRB, the proposed Board would be structurally independent of the particular
prosecutor's office and would not have any direct power over the prosecutor's office except to require
the collection and production of information as requested. Indeed, the only power of the Board is to
study and review the prosecutor's performance and report to the prosecutor and, more importantly,
to the legislature and the public. Whatever effect the Board may have will depend upon other demo-
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As mirrors, the Boards could help prosecutors see their own behav-
ior as those most affected see it. Hopefully the demographics of prosecu-
tors' offices will come to reflect the demographics of the people governed.
In the interim, there is no need to assume that all white male prosecutors
in charge of offices, and certainly not all prosecutors within offices, are
monolithic and uneducable. Even most white male prosecutors are not
consciously or intentionally biased. These are not the mechanisms
through which bias operates in most of contemporary American society.
Racism, for example, is now more often in the norms, the symbolic and
economic grain and structure of society. Virtually no one even admits to
themself, let alone others, that she or he may be a racist.2 70 Far more
typical today are patterns of racist opinions and attitudes which are
shared and reinforced by groups, what this author calls the circle of ra-
cist ignorance. In such circles of ignorance, where pluralistic ignorance
may account for more good faith evil than intentional race or gender
discrimination, it makes sense to use the prosecutor's inevitable denial of
individual racism as a segue to education. The Boards could serve as a
permeable mirror and sensitize prosecutors to outsider methods and per-
spectives on prosecutorial justice.
Such education might include reviews and contributions of outsider
perspectives at every stage of prosecution. For example, under the pro-
cess described in Part I(B) above, if Board members included significant
outsider perspectives amongst their ranks, the Boards could review from
nontraditional vantage points prosecutorial interpretations of general
statutes, in order to ensure that untoward assumptions or stereotypes
about minorities and women would not go unchallenged. 271 Racist ste-
reotypes, such as the belief that minorities are lazy and would rather
steal than work, or that minority mothers care less (than white mothers)
for the well-being of their children and need added state incentives like
the threat of criminal sanctions to force them to be good mothers, would
cratic processes. For an example of the criticism levelled at the CCRB, see Review Board Has Had
Critics Since Its Start, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1985, at L34, col. 1
270. Lawrence, supra note 78.
271. This could be accomplished through direct contacts with prosecutors and by serving as
amicus curiae in judicial proceedings, issuing reports to legislative bodies, the media and potentially
interested public. Legislative bodies in particular could benefit from this different law enforcement
perspective to help it fashion alternatives to the quick fix of more and more criminal law enforce-
ment as the solution to all of society's ills. Cf Vorenberg, supra note 38, at 1566-68. Some legisla-
tures are becoming more representative of minorities and women. !Kg., Toner, Women in Politics
Gain, ButRoad Is A Long One, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1991, at A6, col. 5; Holguin, Latino Officehold-
ers Increase by 6% Across U.S. in Year- to 4,004, L.A. Times, Dec. 20, 1990, (Nuestro Tiempo), at
2, col. 5.
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not go unchallenged. Study, review and reporting by Boards with out-
sider perspectives might similarly affect prosecutorial views of the suffi-
ciency of evidence (or at least assure somewhat greater evenhandedness),
and tailor the criminal justice system to the individual defendant and
different groups in society. Yet appeals to prosecutors for informed self-
correction probably will not by itself suffice. Some prosecutors will look
at the Board's mirror and like the wicked step-mother in Snow White,
see themselves as the fairest of all.
Attempts must also be made to educate and otherwise influence leg-
islatures. The proposed Boards can be particularly helpful at this too.
These Boards can serve as forums to avoid and bridge divisions among
peoples with allied interests through a medium which does not use white
male normative standards. The prosecution of drug-addicted minority
mothers is illustrative.
These prosecutions separate women from women and minorities
from minorities, all in the name of the "war on drugs." They leave the
white male prosecutor's viewpoint in the middle as the "neutral" arbiter,
deciding when criminal accusatory labels are appropriate tools of social
policy. The Board's outsider feminist and critical race perspectives as
derived from members of the affected communities ought to provide al-
ternative visions of justice. Given the Boards' composition, members
would probably have relatives, friends or neighbors touched by criminal
law enforcement, and in particular, these members might view drug-ad-
dicted mothers and their children as integral and connected parts of their
communities. For these Board members the drug-addicted mother might
not be an evil other but the member's child or parent, relative or neigh-
bor; that is, some one connected to networks of people from which the
Boards themselves are drawn. The Boards' composition raises interest-
ing possibilities for viewing the problem of socially deleterious behavior
as not the acts of disconnected others but as problems within a commu-
nity of connected people. Such outsider perspectives on the Boards
might allow them to serve as the forums for outsiders to coalesce and
then remind legislators and the public that justice entails kindness as well
as punishment. These outsider views on prosecutorial justice would not
only benefit women and minorities.
As alluded to by Kimberly Hardy when she referred to the prosecu-
tion of the thirty-six year old white lawyer, the "war" on illegal drugs
may be a slippery slope leading to the diminution of civil rights and liber-
ties for all Americans.27 2 Hopefully the Boards, or at least a significant
272. Note, Drug Couriers and the Fourth Amendment: Vanishing Privacy Rights for Commercial
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number of its members, would be sensitive to these general issues and
also represent the interests of even those Americans not yet affected by
the sweep of prosecutorial power.
This raises the Boards' potential to act as a catalyst for change and
to transform politics beyond outsider perspectives. The Boards could
serve as a forum for developing and articulating alternative views on the
proper methods, scope and role of governmental power. They could
serve as a point of origin for a different conversation about American
democracy, one that sought to build coalitions predicated on respect for
all, even poor drug-addicted African-American women.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Small groups of people coming together to engage in feminist discussion...
can be extended to include politicalization of the self that focuses on creating
understanding of the ways sex, race, and class together determine our indi-
vidual lot and our collective experience .... When women and men under-
stand that working together to eradicate.., domination is a struggle rooted
in the longing to make a world where everyone can live fully and freely, then
we know our work to be a gesture of love Let us draw upon that love to
heighten our awareness, deepen our compassion, intensify our courage, and
strengthen our commitment
273
Prosecutors have tremendous discretion, particularly at the
precharging stage of the criminal justice process. This discretion is virtu-
ally unconstrained and unchecked by the courts, the legislature, and the
electorate. Under such conditions there is great potential for this power
to be used in unjust ways, particularly when prosecutors' powers are ap-
plied against some of the least powerful in society: drug-addicted poor
minority women. The demographics, pluralistic ignorance, and ideology
of courts do not make them likely centurions to check prosecutorial dis-
Passengers, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1311 (1990); cf. Note, Government Drug Testing: A Question of Rea-
sonableness, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1990); Schmoke, supra note 160; Schuler & McBride, Notes
From The Front: A Dissident Law Enforcement Perspective On Drug Prohibition, 18 HoFSTRA L.
REv. 893 (1990); Benner, Diminishing Expectations of Privacy in the Rehnquist Court, 22 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REv. 825 (1989); see e g., Belkin, Airport Drug Efforts Snaring Innocents Who Fit 'Profiles',
N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
Regardless of whether these observers are correct in singling out drugs as an excuse, they are
certainly correct in noting that there is in some segments a perception that this is so. Indeed, one
observer has suggested that during the rather numerous periods fairly called "wars" involving the
United States, civil liberties are often among the first casualties. The challenge is to prevent the
unnecessary and unjustified loss of civil liberties during these periods of crisis. M. LINHiELD, FREE-
DOM UNDER FRREpassim (1990).
273. Hooks, Feminism: A Transformational Politic, in THEORETICAL PERSPECrIVES ON SEX-
UAL DIFFERENCE 185 (D. Rhode ed. 1990).
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cretion or to inspire corrective justice. Although somewhat more repre-
sentative, legislatures are not likely to be much more effective monitors
and checks on prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutors, legislatures and
courts could all greatly benefit from a new and different source of infor-
mation about prosecutors. The Boards proposed in this article could
provide that information and include the perspectives of different voices,
those from prosecuted communities.
How these Boards might enhance democracy has been illustrated
through the paradigm of the prosecution of poor and minority drug-ad-
dicted mothers. If actual but unremedied injustice is occurring, as ap-
pears to be the case in connection with the prosecution of drug-addicted
women, then at the very least there ought to be orchestrated counter-
point to prosecutors' voices. These different voices regarding drug-ad-
dicted mothers are more likely to be forthcoming from those who have
connections through community and life with those prosecuted.
Through the Boards proposed in this article, perhaps new visions of
prosecutorial justice might be seen and reform engendered. The Boards,
with their outsider perspectives and illumination of prosecutorial prac-
tices, would not necessarily assure better prosecutorial justice. They
would enhance the likelihood that different voices would also be heard,
voices which are hearing a different drum beat than the current relentless
call for more jail, more jail, more jail. Perhaps the Boards can be one of
Bell Hooks' small groups and catalyze a transformation away from
prosecutorial control and towards self-control, more democracy and so-
cietal justice.274
274. See B. BARBER, supra note 262, at 307-09.
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